Glass Walls: Experimental Evidence on Access Constraints Faced by Women

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Abstract

Many in the developing world face substantial access barriers. Using experimental evidence from Pakistan, we show distance imposes a significant constraint on women's enrollment in skills training that is not readily reconciled with time or economic costs of travel. Women whose villages received a training center are four times as likely to complete training than those who travel a few kilometers outside their village. Half the penalty is paid upon crossing the (virtual) village boundary. Exogenous stipend variation reveals this boundary constraint is costly to compensate, requiring a cash transfer of half of household expenditure. While informational and social interventions don't ameliorate this barrier, reliable group transportation helps. Heterogeneous treatment effects suggest the boundary effect is due to social perceptions constraining women's mobility. Our work provides experimental confirmation that non-economic access constraints faced by women are significant, costly to address monetarily, but can be ameliorated through locally attuned interventions.

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1 Introduction

Low-income countries are increasingly setting up welfare systems and providing economic opportunities for their citizens through cash transfer, employment generation, and skills enhancement programs. Many of these policies are directed towards those who have been historically excluded from state programs—the poor, rural inhabitants, and women. The success of such polices relies on these individuals being able to access the benefits provided to them. While there is some acknowledgement that the same factors which led to these vulnerable populations' exclusion could also generate obstacles in accessing benefits, simple economic calculations are often used to dismiss the salience of access constraints. The assumption is that if the value is sufficient, then the needy will seek private benefits, and that travel costs can be compensated through small financial incentives. Yet in practice, we often see "money left on the table." Studies document how villagers do not obtain subsidized rice, widows fail to take advantage of monthly stipends, and women are unable to obtain vocational training, despite the large gains such programs may have (Banerjee et al., 2018; Gupta, 2017; Dasgupta et al., 2015; Maitra and Mani, 2017; Bandiera et al., 2020).

This paper uses experimental variation to estimate the value of one such access constraint—travel that requires a woman to move outside her community. We study a skills development program in rural Pakistan, which is representative of many underdeveloped regions throughout the world where female mobility—a widely recognized barrier to development (Klugman et al., 2014)—is a challenge for both logistical and cultural reasons. Understanding such gendered access barriers is increasingly important, especially as emerging economies are introducing a plethora of programs to address substantial welfare gaps and skill shortages in their populations, many of which require traveling outside one's community. Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been paid to whether individuals can readily access such programs, and the tradeoffs between distributing access points to nearby versus centralized locations.

Causally identifying distance-related access barriers is a challenge in the literature because the locations where benefits are accessed are likely endogenous to confounding factors. For example, if training facilities locate in impoverished areas, distance-related access constraints will be underestimated if the poor have lower demand (and hence lower program take-up rates) as compared to others (in richer/higher demand areas) that are further away. Conversely, if the poor have higher demand, that placement would lead to overestimating access constraints. Even if one could accurately identify the presence of access barriers,

additional assumptions are needed in observational studies to capture the economic significance of such barriers and shed light on what factors may underlie them.

The program we study offers a compelling opportunity to address these identification challenges in the context of free-of-cost, high-quality, and in-demand skills training. We leverage training program design to make three contributions. First, by introducing exogenous variation in the location of the training centers, we provide what is, to our knowledge, the first precise and causally identified estimate of distance-related access constraints faced by women. Second, in doing so, we isolate a novel crossing-the-boundary cost (hereafter "the boundary effect") that occurs over and above the physical, temporal, and financial costs accrued per kilometer of travel. This demonstrates that substantial non-economic components underlie access barriers. Third, by experimentally varying the stipend amount provided to compensate for travel costs and foregone wages, we can directly estimate the (substantial) financial compensation needed to overcome these travel-based access constraints. Finally, we provide a deeper understanding of these access constraints by (i) experimentally introducing additional program variations specifically designed to address underlying factors and (ii) by exploring how the boundary effect varies with pre-existing household and community characteristics.

Our study sample includes 243 villages where women were offered training in sewing and tailoring, skills for which a large majority (74%) had expressed a demand at baseline (Cheema et al., 2012a). The experimental design randomly allocated 108 training centers among the sample villages, thereby generating exogenous variation in distance between a trainee's home and the training center (while the training centers were located in certain villages, any woman from neighboring villages could also apply for a spot in the program). To enable estimation of the economic magnitude of distance constraints, we further introduced exogenous variation in the training stipend offered at the individual level. We also tested program design variations that included enhanced information, trainee and community engagement, and group transport in order to shed light on underlying factors that might contribute to access constraints.[1]

[1]Earlier work with our implementing partner, the Punjab Skills Development Fund (PSDF), in 2011 revealed high demand for vocational skills: 90% of rural households were interested and nominated at least one male and one female member to participate in training. Yet only 10% of these individuals availed the opportunity of free training with a stipend when it was subsequently offered (Cheema et al., 2012b). Quantitative analysis and information from focus groups revealed that women faced considerable travel-related access constraints. Based on this preliminary work, we designed a range of interventions in the subsequent program rollout to isolate and estimate the size of any travel–based barriers and address the underlying concerns identified by women in the focus groups.

Our first main result documents the presence of a large distance-driven access barrier across the range of program take-up measures—from the initial desire to apply to course enrollment and completion. Specifically, we find that establishing a training center in the village increases course enrollment and completion four-fold. For villages where no center is set up and women must travel outside the village to get training, the take-up declines with distance from the training center. Our empirical design allows us to isolate what part of this distance penalty arises simply from crossing the village boundary and what is induced by the additional distance a woman must cover to attend an out-of-village training center. Our second result is striking: half of the access difference between in-village and out-of-village training is generated simply by crossing this (invisible) village boundary. This strong "boundary effect" cannot be reconciled with any standard economic or time opportunity costs: crossing the village boundary does not induce a discontinuous jump in either distance or time (there is no "village border" one has to wait to cross nor any toll paid at entry or exit, and there is no discontinuity in transport wait times and other fixed costs), suggesting that non-economic factors must be substantially at play.

For our third result we use the exogenous variation in stipend amount within and across villages to quantify these distance penalties (both the boundary effect and per-kilometer travel costs) in monetary terms. We compare the increase in take-up induced by additional stipend with the distance penalties and provide an equivalence between the penalties and the stipend. Using these estimates, we find that a monthly stipend of PKR 6-8K is required to induce the average woman in our sample to attend training outside their village. Fully 3.5-5K (51% of monthly household expenditure and 45% of monthly household income) of this is needed just to overcome the boundary effect—a sizable amount, especially since the course itself is free. These compensatory stipend amounts are 4-5 times the (generous) estimates of additional travel costs (fare plus opportunity cost of travel and wait time) that the median woman in our sample would have to incur in traveling outside her village for training. While distance-related access barriers have been recognized in the literature, our paper presents the first experimental evidence on the shape of those barriers as well as their economic significance in a manner that should inform decision-making about how to provide services, especially for women.

Finally, we take our analysis a step further and explore what type of non-economic factors may be underpinning distance-related access barriers. We focus on the three broad factors identified during our extensive preliminary fieldwork: limited information, community-level attitudes, and travel-related safety concerns. In partnership with local training providers,

we helped design and experimentally introduce three additional program variations: (i) more intense dissemination of course information to address informational gaps and trainee and household concerns, (ii) community engagement to ameliorate societal concerns, and (iii) group transport to address perceived safety and social concerns related to travel. We find little impact of the first two interventions, both of which are often introduced in such programs by state and non-governmental actors. Consistent with recent work highlighting the importance of female transport (Borker, 2018; Muralidharan and Prakash, 2017; Field and Vyborny, 2019), we do find a sizable effect of offering group transport. Almost a half to two-thirds of the boundary effect can be compensated for by offering women group transport from their own village to a training center outside of their village. Furthermore, we find the boundary-effect is smaller for women who have greater autonomy in domestic affairs; who come from lower income families (likely to have lower socioeconomic status); and who live in more ethnically diverse communities. Overall, these results highlight the importance of constraints arising from non-economic and community-level factors, which include women's lack of agency within their households and concerns about perceived status loss because of their leaving and potentially being exposed to outside influence.

Our findings are especially noteworthy since our randomized evaluation of the overall program shows that there are substantial individual benefits arising from the skills training provided (Cheema et al., 2019). Thus, to the extent that these access constraints exist, they are preventing women from building valuable skills.

Our work speaks to a broad literature that studies barriers which prevent marginalized communities from utilizing public or private services. The role of distance as a barrier to the flow of goods and services has been well documented in the trade literature, and also noted across a wide range of other fields—including health, finance, and education—as an impediment to service take-up.[2] But causal estimates are rare and few studies have used experimental variation to either precisely estimate of the size and nature/functional form of these costs or their economic value. This is one of the key contributions of our paper, which complements and furthers excellent recent work in this area. Jacoby and Mansuri (2015), for instance, use OLS and instrumental variables regressions to highlight

[2]Engel and Rogers (1996), Evans and Harrigan (2005), and Gallego and Llano (2014) examine the impact of distance on trade. Thornton (2008), Ekirapa-Kiracho et al. (2011), and Kremer et al. (2011) find distance impacts program take-up for medical services and Ashraf et al. (2006) finds effects for financial services. Porter et al. (2011), Burde and Linden (2013), Jacoby and Mansuri (2015), Jayachandran (2015), Mukherjee (2012), Maitra and Mani (2017), Muralidharan and Prakash (2017), and Bandiera et al. (2020) consider how distance effects take-up of educational and training services.

the costs of crossing a settlement boundary in Pakistan. They show that (high-caste) girls who have to cross a settlement boundary within their village to attend primary school have lower enrollment, while boys face no such boundary constraints. While compelling and consistent with our work, the paper does not use experimental variation to identify the shape of these costs or assess the compensation required to overcome boundary effects.

Most randomized control trials which have studied the impact of travel distance do not explicitly randomize location or estimate distance's economic value. Rather, they examine heterogeneous effects by (potentially endogenous) distance. For example, Ashraf et al. (2006) randomize access to bank deposits, Maitra and Mani (2017) to job training, and Phillips (2014) to job search assistance. All find take-up drops with distance to the relevant service. Turning to the few papers that are able to introduce experimental variation in distance, both Thornton (2008) and Burde and Linden (2013) directly vary the location of public services—HIV test result centers and schools, respectively. Both show greater distance-related barriers for women. Thornton (2008) finds a steep decline in the probability of obtaining HIV test results at 1.5 km, especially for women in regions with majority Islamic populations, consistent with socially conservative norms, and that the gender gap is not present in non-Muslim areas. However, the overall decline with distance and most of the gender gap are addressed by small incentive payments. Burde and Linden (2013) show that opening a primary school within a village in rural Afghanistan increased girls' enrollment rates by more than 50%, which erased most of the gender gap in enrollment, and identify social acceptability as a potential mechanism. While compelling in highlighting the salience of distance and suggestive of non-economic factors, neither of these studies uncovers a clear access discontinuity at the village boundary, calibrates the economic value of the boundary, or provides additional experimental interventions designed to address underlying factors.

Our paper also demonstrates the importance of dedicated transport services for women. Lack of transportation is cited as an important factor underpinning distance-related barriers for women, with studies noting women often lack reliable means of transportation especially relative to men, and providing transport can help raise access.[3] The findings suggest that a higher burden of care work and the absence of reliable transportation force women to limit their options for work and educational opportunities to those within walking distance

[3]See Ekirapa-Kiracho et al. (2011) for how a lack of transportation impacts take-up of medical services. Starkey and Hine (2014), Thakuriah et al. (2011), Babinard and Scott (2011), Uteng (2012), Porter et al. (2011), and Borker et al. (2020) discuss how a lack of transportation impacts women's employment opportunities and mobility.

of their homes (Thakuriah et al., 2011; Babinard and Scott, 2011). When women do venture far from their homes, they are frequently plagued by security concerns. Mitra-Sarkar and Partheeban (2011) find that 66% of women report being sexually harassed on their commutes to work in Chennai, India, and Porter et al. (2011) find parents were reluctant to send their girls to schools outside their village due to security concerns. Borker (2018) finds that female students in Delhi, India are willing to pay a substantial amount more in tuition for safer routes. There is a more recent literature that shows how dedicated female transport can help. Muralidharan and Prakash (2017) utilize a compelling triple difference approach to show that a public program providing bicycles to girls in the state of Bihar, India significantly increased their secondary school enrollment, likely by reducing travel time and enhancing travel safety, but lack the experimental variation to give precise estimates about the compensation required to address distance barriers. In ongoing work, Field and Vyborny (2019) are conducting a randomized controlled trial of women's-only transport in Lahore, Pakistan, to rigorously test how such facilities impact women's mobility, labor force participation, and empowerment, while Borker et al. (2020) are examining how women's mobility is impacted by a reform that made bus travel free for women in Delhi, India. Our work complements this literature by experimentally introducing women-only transport services and examining whether this overcomes access barriers.Beyond transportation constraints, lack of information on the program's potential benefits can also act as a barrier to taking up a service. For example, Jensen (2010) finds that providing information to students about the expected returns to education increased the average number of years Dominican students stayed in school. A similar study conducted by Nguyen (2008) in Madagascar finds that information increased both school attendance and test scores. By introducing additional experimental variation in information provided to women, we examine whether such informational gaps underlie the distance-related access barriers observed and do not find any evidence for this.

Our work also adds to a large literature that underscores constraints women face in socioeconomic life (World-Bank, 2012). In both developed and developing countries, women face significant barriers in accessing labor market opportunities, with social factors playing a key constraining role (Bertrand, 2011; Jayachandran, 2015; Klasen, 2019; Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016). In developed countries, women's labor force outcomes are adversely affected by perceptions of women as homemakers or primary caregivers as well as occupation-related gender stereotypes (Fortin, 2005, 2015; Goldin, 1995; Kleven et al., 2019). Even the effectiveness of policies designed to promote female labor

force outcomes is influenced by cultural attitudes toward gender roles.[4] In developing countries, these effects are more pronounced with gender norms such as social stigma regarding appropriate work for women or "motherhood penalties" serving to restrict women's access to economic opportunities (Bedi et al., 2018; Klasen and Pieters, 2015; Bandiera et al., 2020). Norms regarding women's status relative to men's also adversely impact women in leadership roles (Macchiavello et al., 2015; Gangadharan et al., 2016; BenYishay et al., 2020). Moreover, in traditional societies, dominant religious or caste values often tend to reduce women's mobility and social interactions beyond household boundaries, thereby repressing women's ability to benefit from economic opportunities (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; Field et al., 2010).

Finally, our paper directly contributes to the understanding of active labor market programs, such as vocational training, by focusing on their take-up rates, an aspect often neglected in the literature. Many papers examine the economic impacts of vocational training programs, in developed and developing countries (See Betcherman et al., 2004 for a review). While the literature on U.S. job training programs has recognized take-up as a difficult challenge either in the overall population or in specific sub-groups (Bloom, 1997; Sandell and Rupp, 1988; Heckman and Smith, 2004), it has not received the same attention in the literature on developing countries. Moreover, in both contexts, few studies track enrollment from the eligible population, making it difficult to know what the "natural" take-up rate should be for most programs. Studies that track self-selected applicants show course completion rates ranging from 21% to 95%, while those which consider general enrollment in the population find average take-up rates from as low as 5% to as high as 21% (Bloom, 1997; Sandell and Rupp, 1988; Maitra and Mani, 2017; Bandiera et al., 2020).[5]

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the context and intervention. Section 3 outlines the experimental and empirical design. Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes.

[4]Using data from 22 industrialized countries, Budig et al. (2012) found that parental leaves and public childcare are more effective in raising women's pay where maternal employment is widely accepted. In contrast, where cultural values favor the "male breadwinner/female caregiver model," the effects of these policies are less positive or even negative.

[5]On a summary of results from the United States see Heckman et al. (2000). For other countries see e.g. Hirshleifer et al. (2000); Alzea et al. (2020). Dasgupta et al. (2015) use an artefactual experiment to study behavioral traits that influence the selection process.

2 Context & Intervention

2.1 Country Context: Gender, Human Capital and Labor Markets

Human capital acquisition offers a pathway for many to improve their economic, social, and health outcomes. Women have historically faced systematic obstacles in accessing human capital enhancement opportunities. Encouragingly, the global gap between male and female education rates has steadily closed over the past two decades (World-Bank, 2012). This progress has been made possible by systematically addressing barriers, both social and economic, that women face in pursuing education.

Pakistan is typical of many regions of the world where women still face substantial access barriers.[6] Socially conservative norms are recognized as an important factor limiting women's labor force participation and agency in such regions (Jayachandran, 2019 provides a comprehensive discussion). Women must overcome social norms against investing in education and have relatively fewer educational opportunities. Unfortunately, this is not an especially unique context. In 2011, UN WomenWatch published survey results from 42 countries showing that rural girls are more likely to be out of school than rural boys and are twice as likely to be out of school as urban girls. In our sample, we find that over 70% of women have never been enrolled in any form of formal education.

While access constraints could also be present for men, in prior work we found that distance appeared to be far less of a constraint on men.[7] We therefore focus in this paper on barriers to women's skills acquisition and explore solutions to their unique constraints. Not only do women traditionally face more substantial access issues, our prior work and the literature suggest the nature of the underlying factors that contribute to barriers for women and men are likely quite different. As a result, we made a conscious choice in our study: rather than compare differences in access across genders, it would be more instructive to focus on comparisons *between* women that experience slightly different constraint allevi-

[6] Appendix Figure B1 shows how Pakistan compares to countries in MENA and South Asia along a range of female outcomes (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/).

[7] Appendix A provides details. Randomized training opportunities were offered to both men and women. While both take-up rates were low for both, factors such as current employment status and future perceived employability were more salient for men. Notably, distance was nota constraint for men. While distance was not randomly assigned in this prior work, there was a strong negative relationship for rural women between physical distance and voucher acceptance, course enrollment, and course completion, controlling for a host of individual-level characteristics such as monthly income, education, and employment status. Distance was statistically insignificant for men and the point estimates of the distance penalty for women were around 10 times larger than that for men.

ation strategies, thereby allowing us to hold constant any unobservable variables that are unique to all women (but are different for men).[8]

2.2 Program Background and Design

The skills training program we study was implemented by PSDF, a not-for-profit company set up as part of the Punjab Economic Opportunities Program (PEOP)—a Government of Punjab program implemented in partnership with the UK Department for International Development (DfID) that aimed to increase employability and earnings of low-income and vulnerable families by augmenting human capital through vocational training.

The program design was informed by prior work by the Center for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP) that revealed low take-up rates for vocational courses, especially for women (see Appendix A for details). That low take-up was surprising given the high reported demand for training—over 90% of the households nominated a female member who wanted to receive the training—as well as strong expectations that this training would lead to increased skills and returns, a belief borne out in our subsequent work.[9] This suggests that women were likely facing barriers in realizing their demand and these access barriers were indeed costly, which makes understanding and alleviating these access constraints all

[8]It is common in other contexts to study the effects of a constraint on women by using men as a benchmark. For instance, to understand the gender wage gap, one must necessarily include men's wages as a baseline. However, in our case, a more natural benchmark is that women who express a demand for training should (eventually) be able to access it. This benchmark then allows us to consider a range of design variations for women skill building programs. Each variation is designed to address an underlying factor/mechanism. By examining the impact on program take-up, we can shed light onto the particular factors that lead to women's access constraints and can then seek to ameliorate these factors. Within a fixed budget, there is an inherent tradeoff between going deeper on mechanisms for women vs. comparing cross-gender differences in access constraints. Given the robust literature on the additional constraints women face, we preferred the former approach and focused on understanding women's constraints and how to alleviate them.

[9]Given this high expressed demand, lower take-up rates can be interpreted as deviations from women's preferred outcomes. From a welfare perspective, it is important to also note that these beliefs (regarding positive returns to training) appear to have been correct. In a companion (work-in-progress) paper on the impact of the skills training program, we confirm such positive returns (Cheema et al., 2019). Specifically, our initial findings suggest that women who (exogenously) received the training report improved skills, higher tailoring activity, and an increase in (tailoring and overall household) income as well as a reduction in clothing expenditures. Further analysis suggests that these gains persist even 2.5 years after the training especially when combined with an intervention to improve market access. Since the access constraints in obtaining skills likely also impact the ability of women to access the market (to be able to deploy their newly acquired skills), the program also included post-training "market linkage" components. Results suggest that these linkages further enhance the impact of the initial training, increasing income gains almost four-fold and also generating positive impacts on female empowerment.

the more important. Below we describe the main program, as well as five (experimental) variations introduced to separately study the impact of various constraints revealed through our qualitative work.

The training program focused on teaching tailoring as a vocational skill along with basic literacy, numeracy, and financial literacy.[10] The training was delivered over a four-month period, five to six days per week in the morning, typically from 9 am to 1 pm, and each trainee was required to maintain an attendance rate of 80%. Each trainee admitted to the course had a workstation with a desk and a sewing machine to use for the length of the course. The courses were implemented by established training service providers. Trainees reported the training was high quality in post-treatment surveys: 55% reported that the quality of the course content, training conduct, and facilities was high or very high; 69% of trainees said the course met or exceeded their expectations; and 74% reported that the training helped them improve their tailoring skills.

To better understand the low take-up rates noted previously, a series of field visits were carried out to elicit qualitative feedback encompassing different limitations that women face in accessing skills training as well as to assess the practicality of different solutions aimed at alleviating these constraints. Interviews were conducted with household members (both males and females) and influential community members. These visits identified five primary constraints to resolve: distance, information, social norms, reliable transportation, and money.[11] Each of these constraints were then directly addressed through the following program variants:

Distance - Given the importance of distance, a subset of program villages were (randomly) selected to house a training center in the village itself. As a result, households in these villages were, on average, closer to their training center than households in other villages: the median travel distance for trainees in villages with and without a training center was 1.1 kilometers and 9.25 kilometers, respectively. We will refer to the former sam-

[10] Initially a wider range of vocational skills training was offered. However, with the vast majority of women picking training, PSDF chose to focus on that skill. The additional literacy and numeracy components were added as pilot work revealed most women who desired such training lacked requisite skills needed for tailoring (writing down orders, taking measurements, preparing budgets, opening a bank account etc.). So rather than make those a precondition, and lower access, PSDF included them as part of their training.

[11] Interestingly, while our prior assumption had been that child care would be an important issue, our qualitative field visits demonstrated little demand on the part of women for such a service. Women were either confident that their own family members could take care of their children or, even when they did not have such help, not comfortable with it being provided by non-family members.

ple villages as Village Based Training (VBT) villages and the latter as non-Village Based Training (nVBT) villages.

Financial Constraints - For rural women, participation in the training program may imply additional travel costs or potential income loss due to the opportunity cost of time allocated to the training program. Lack of financial compensation for such costs was the second-most cited reason for course dropout in prior program rollouts (Cheema et al., 2013). To address this, every trainee was offered a base stipend of PKR 1,500, paid monthly. To rigorously test the impact of these stipends, a (randomly selected) subset of households were provided additional stipends as high as PKR 4,500, resulting in a final variation in monthly stipend amounts from PKR 1,500 to 6,000.[12] Stipends were disbursed four times and were only given to individuals still enrolled in the program with a minimum attendance rate of 80%.[13]

Information - Pre-treatment interviews with the sample population revealed that there was interest and need among potential applicants to learn about the skills being taught, the quality of the training provider, and the logistics of the training. To address this issue, PSDF worked with local training organizations to design a Trainee Engagement (TE) arm administered in a (randomly) selected subset of villages. In TE villages, applicable households were first invited to hour-long, female-only information sessions with potential trainees about the training program and notified of the program's date, time, and location. Two to three days later, information sessions were held which disseminated information regarding course content and quality, female instructor credentials, course timings and duration, training center facility standards, and application submission protocol. Sessions shared success stories of three trainees from previous trainings. These testimonies emphasized the lifelong value of the tailoring course, showing how past trainees used their skills to earn or save money by making higher-quality clothes for themselves, their families, and

[12]Stipend randomization happened in two stages. First villages were randomized into a midpoint for the additional stipend of PKR 500, 1000, ... , 4000. Then potential trainees were randomized into receiveing that amount, PKR 500 more, or PKR 500 less. This approach kept the within-village stipend range modest to avoid a 'disengagement' effect from those offered lower stipends.

[13]To make payments easy for trainees stipend top-ups were provided in four monthly installments through EasyPaisa, a mobile payment service which allows withdrawal free of charge at retail outlets. Our team helped households set up accounts when necessary, made calls to ensure households received their top-ups, maintained a helpline to resolve issues, and hand-delivered withdrawal codes to household that did not have a mobile phone. Control over money is often a concern in such settings. At endline 91% of trainees reported having either a large (54%) or moderate (37%) influence over where the money was spent. Trainees did not always directly retrieve the money: 44% of women reported that their spouse/fiance did so and 25% their parents.

their neighbors, and by teaching fellow villagers how to stitch. The session included a Q&A, which allowed attendees to ask any logistical or informational questions regarding the course. Attendees were given details regarding a three-day Open Period, during which they could visit the training center to see the facilities, meet the trainers, and ask any remaining questions about the course. Finally, a few days later, each household invited to the sessions received a follow-up visit, whereby visitors redistributed written information and answered any remaining questions. The TE treatment was designed to address the kinds of information gaps identified in our preliminary work as well as the literature as barriers to training (Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008; Dinkelman and Martinez A., 2014)

Societal Constraints - Restrictive community constraints present an additional barrier to access for rural women. In our context, men may see the transgression of restrictive gender norms by women associated with them as impacting their own reputation directly (Jamali, 2009) and therefore be unwilling to allow women of their household to participate in training, even if they see its value (Naqvi et al., 2002). Such barriers were often mentioned in our fieldwork and surveys with household heads citing social reasons as one of the factors behind a reluctance to have female household members apply for skills training. PSDF worked with local training organizations to address this constraint by conducting 75- to 90-minute community-level information sessions——the Community Engagement (CE) treatment——separately for males and females in 81 villages. Respected community members and elders were invited to attend these sessions. In addition to providing all of the information communicated in the TE treatment, the CE information sessions aimed to engage the wider community. They discussed the societal challenges women face in accessing and benefiting from the training as well as ways in which the community members could facilitate female members to overcome these access barriers. Trained community mobilizers moderated the conversation. Community members and meeting attendees were also offered free transportation to the training center during the Open Period so that everyone (potential trainees and respected community members) could see that the facilities were indeed appropriate. As with TE, subsequent follow-up visits redistributed written information and answered any additional questions. This treatment was designed to address potential barriers due to community-level constraints and was analogous to interventions that aim to enhance female employment by addressing societal concerns.[14]

[14]See Jayachandran (2019) for a review on approaches to shifting underlying gender norms; Dean and Jayachandran (2019) and McKelway (2020) for their analysis of how direct attempts to change gender norms can improve female employment outcomes; and for a review of health interventions that rely on affecting gender norms.

Safe & Reliable Transport - In the context of rural women, a lack of safe and reliable transportation as well as norms surrounding what is considered to be appropriate means of travel may compound the physical distance constraint. Male household members often cited such concerns and would refuse permission for women to visit training centers in other villages unless they were accompanied by others. To alleviate this concern, free Group Transportation (GT) to the training centers was offered in a (randomly) selected subset of villages. Care was taken to ensure that the transportation was seen as safe, reliable and socially acceptable by the villagers. Based on focus group feedback, this transport consisted of women traveling in small groups using drivers from the same community the women were from. This was implemented by first holding a meeting with men where they nominated local drivers and suggested logistical arrangements of the facility. The proposed arrangements were shortlisted and then confirmed with female household members after eliciting their preferences regarding the provision of group transport. A final meeting helped finalize these arrangements. Households were then provided with printed information about the group transport facility, including the driver's name, mode of transport, pick-up and drop-off locations, and schedules. This service was offered in a randomly selected set of nVBT villages only, as the distance needed to travel for households in VBT villages was deemed too short for transportation to be a salient constraint.

3 Experimental Design, Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Sample & Experimental Design

Our sample frame comprised rural areas from the three districts in southern Punjab (Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, and Muzaffargarh). These are fairly typical of the country's agrarian regions, though slightly poorer than the typical district in Punjab. Power calculations for detecting differential takeup between treatment arms using the intra-cluster correlation observed inearlier pilots showed that approximately 240 villages and 4,500 households were required to provide at least 80% power to detect a 0.2-0.3 SD impact at the 5% significance level. To be conservative, we expanded to 243 villages and 6,200 households.

Villages were randomly selected. Within each village, we randomly selected 25 households tfor the study. These households were surveyed and received a training voucher they could use to nominate a female member for the training. We randomly assigned each village to one of eight treatment branches based on the constraint alleviation strategies (re-

ferred to here as treatments) described above in Section 2.2. Appendix Table B1 provides a breakdown of the number of villages and households in each treatment branch.

We executed the randomization in multiple stages. First, we divided the three districts into 27 total grids based on geographical proximity, each containing nine treatment villages. Four of these nine villages were then randomly selected to have a training center in the village (VBT) with the remaining five to have no training center located directly in the village (nVBT); we refer to these two primary treatment branches as the standard intervention.[15] All households in the standard intervention (i.e. all households in this study) received basic information about the course through a house visit, during which we offered the households basic information about PSDF, the training organization as well as the course being offered (verbally and in writing), communicated information regarding the base stipend, and asked them to identify an eligible female member to participate. If the household accepted the training offer, another visit was conducted during which each household received a printed voucher in the name of the prospective trainee.

Stratifying on this primary randomization, we then further randomly assigned the five nVBT villages to receive either trainee engagement (TE), community engagement (CE), reliable group transport (GT), a combination of CE and GT, or no additional treatment (standard intervention only). The four VBT villages were randomized into the CE, TE, or standard-intervention-only branch, and the fourth was randomly assigned to either the TE or standard-intervention-only treatment branch. Note that no VBT villages were randomized into the GT treatment, as we deemed a transportation service less relevant in VBT villages, given that within-village travel distance is much smaller.

Appendix Table B4 shows balance tests for the simpler VBT and nVBT comparisons are as expected—in fact only two of the 40 baseline variables are significantly different between the two. Amongst others, given the importance of distance in our subsequent results, it is noteworthy that there is also no imbalance in the availability and wait times of different public transport modes. Similarly, balance tests across the full eight treatment types in Appendix Table C1 shows balance as expected between these treatments.

We also randomly assigned the total stipend amount at both the village and the household level. As noted above, in addition to a base stipend of PKR 1,500 per month, a ran-

[15] An additional three villages per grid were surveyed as pure controls. These are used to evaluate the impact of training on economic outcomes in related studies (Cheema et al., 2019, 2018) but are not used in this paper. Neither vouchers nor basic information about the training opportunity were distributed in these villages. Given the spatial spread among sample villages, it is unlikely that information about the trainings offered even reached these villages and no one from these "pure" control villages enrolled in the course.

domly selected subset of households received an additional stipend top-up as high as PKR 4,500. We determined this range through analysis of previous pilot data, which indicated that stipends in this range were most cost-effective at increasing take-up. Appendix Table B2 reports the total number of households which received each level of stipend top-up. Note that while stipend amount was allocated randomly, the probability of being assigned each amount varied throughout the range of possible amounts. In particular, budgetary constraints limited additional top-ups to only a limited number of the (surveyed) households.[16]

Finally, we randomly selected a subset of our original households (from among all eight treatment arms) and additionally offered a voucher to a neighboring household. For each sample household selected to receive the additional neighbor treatment, we visited the sample household's address and identified the closest neighboring household that fulfilled the following criteria: it was not an existing sample household, consented to being interviewed, and contained an eligible female household member. We included this treatment to test whether simultaneously inviting neighboring women would decrease the potential resistance by family members concerned about public perceptions of a woman traveling and training alone. Note that while these additional neighboring households were selected to receive vouchers after the original households, all vouchers were delivered at the same time in order to eliminate any effect of timing or revisits on take-up. We randomly selected neighboring houses stratifying on our primary VBT randomization, thus inviting the neighbors of 550 (20%) of VBT households and 550 (16%) of nVBT households.

3.2 Data Collection

Our data comes from three sources—household surveys, administrative data, and a distance-mapping exercise. Appendix A provides a timeline of surveys and field visits (Figure A1) as well as a brief summary of all data collected in each. The baseline household survey con-

[16] A potential concern is that those allocated a smaller stipend may perceive the allocation as unfair and this may adversely impact their enrollment. However, field interviews suggested that households were comfortable with stipend variation as long as each received a minimum stipend and any extra amount was determined through a fair ballot process. A review of literature also supports this observation (Blount (1995); Bolton et al. (2005)). . In order to ensure our process was viewed as fair, the stipend variation was randomized in stages and the outcome provided in a sealed, marked envelope opened in the household head's presence. We first randomly selected the 10 households to receive only the base stipend. We then randomized the remaining households in each village into one of 8 "stipend buckets." Each bucket allocated one of three stipend amounts (low, medium, or high), where the difference between the high and low additional stipend amounts within a bucket (i.e. within a village) was always PKR 1,000. There were no reported cases of discontent regarding the difference in stipend values.

sists mainly of information on demographic and outcome variables about the household and the nominated female member. During subsequent household visits for intervention roll-out, we conducted surveys both to verify voucher acceptance and to ensure that households had been informed of all treatment activities within their village. The follow-up household survey (six months after the training concluded) helped verify the take-up status recorded through the previous surveys and administrative data and collected information on the impact of the course on the trainee and her household.

Throughout the intervention, our team and the training service providers continued collecting extensive administrative data, including voucher submission lists, initial enrollment status, and regular attendance records, in order to accurately form rosters and disburse stipends. Continuously collecting administrative data also allowed us to track each respondent's take-up status independently of their self-reported status. Given our primary outcome of interest is program take-up, we measured it in four stages (of increasing commitment): (i) voucher acceptance, (ii) voucher submission, (iii) course enrollment, and (iii) course completion. Appendix A provides further details on how these measures were elicited. Briefly, the first was collected during a household visit ("voucher delivery") after the baseline survey and indicated whether a household had nominated a specific member for training. The second measure captured whether the household then submitted their voucher at the training center during the open enrollment period. The last two measures captured whether the individual actually showed up when the course started and eventually completed the course.[17]

Given that distance to training center is one of our key explanatory variables, we conducted a distance mapping exercise in order to accurately measure the route each respondent would take from an informal cluster of houses where her home is located (i.e. co-locational neighborhoods in this context) to the nearest training center. During this exercise, we recorded not only the distance to the training center, but also the anticipated time and cost of travel for multiple modes of transportation. As euclidean measure could underestimate the actual distance a trainee would need to travel, we measured distance in three

[17] As Appendix A details, training was open to any woman in the village (whether she was a voucher holder or not—the voucher process was just implemented for our sample households to enable tracking them). For the few training centers which had more applicants than they could accept, a ballot was used to generate enrollment rosters and waitlists. Enrollment status for individuals who never had a chance to get off the waitlist (less than 10% of our sample) is defined to be missing since we cannot assume what their enrollment status would have been had they been given a chance to actually enroll. Since the (waitlist) order was randomized (and the individuals are effectively excluded from our sample), this does not affect our analysis.

different ways: (i) "Straight-line distance" from each nVBT village's centroid to the nearest VBT village's centroid based on GPS. Since it was not feasible to assign training center randomly *within* a village, we set this measure of distance to be zero for VBT villages; (ii) "Cluster-level travel distance" based on grouping households into geographic clusters and conducting an elaborate distance mapping exercise, in which distance was physically measured from each cluster to the training center by a surveyor on a motorcycle (for extensive details on this surveying procedure, see Appendix A); and (iii) "Travel distance," which averages the cluster-level travel distance measure within each village to find the distance from the village's population centroid to the training center. Since the training center location *within* the village is not randomly assigned, this may create an endogeneity problem (for example, if rich households have the center located closer to them). By averaging the cluster-level travel distance, this third measure removes any parts of distance that could be endogenous within the village, while still allowing us to construct a non-zero travel distance measure, even for VBT villages.

Appendix Table B3 provides basic summary statistics. We see that the average household in our sample has a monthly income of PKR 11,000 and has between six and seven members. Roughly half of the households are ethnically Punjabi, while the other half are primarily Seraiki (the remaining 3% belong to other minority ethnicities). As for the prospective trainees themselves, we see that 70% are married and only 34% have any formal education. Additionally, 32% are involved in paid work, 32% have any ability to stitch, and only 5% engaged in any form of stitching in the last month. These basic statistics show that our course offered an opportunity with high potential value for our sample. Furthermore, we asked respondents a series of questions regarding women's influence over household and business decisions, as these may impact program take-up. We report summary statistics on these in the form of two influence indices here.

Appendix Table B3 also reports our three main distance measures. Note that while average distances to a training center are not that large (a 3.2 km straight-line distance including villages where the training center is in the village; excluding them gives an average of 5.8 km), there is still sufficient variation to estimate distance effects on take-up rates. Moreover, not surprisingly, traveled (measured) distance is larger than straight-line distance by almost a factor of 2. We also show our main outcome variables on program take-up. While voucher acceptance rates are reasonably high at 63%, class completion rates are quite low. Only 22% of the population completed the course. This average masks substantial variation across villages, a point that we will explore in more detail below.

3.3 Empirical Strategy

Because treatment status was assigned randomly we interpret the differences in take-up rates between treatment branches as the causal impact of the treatment. We estimate the effect of our primary treatment, village-based training (VBT), with

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 VBT_i + \rho X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is an indicator for one of our four measures of take-up for individual i; VBT_i is an indicator for individual i living in a village assigned to the VBT treatment branch; X is a matrix of individual-level controls; and ε_i is a random error term. In order to account for any intra-cluster correlation and for the correlation we mechanically create through our stipend treatment design, we cluster this error at the village level. The coefficient β_1 gives the average treatment effect of placing the training center inside the village—what we call the "boundary effect." Since VBT_i is randomly assigned, we do not require X_i for an unbiased estimate of β_1, but adding controls can help provide tighter standard errors. We present results from specifications with and without X_i.[18]

While the above specification cleanly identifies the effect of locating a training center in the village, we can further decompose this effect into two components—an indicator for leaving the village itself (i.e. crossing the village boundary) and a continuous variable for the actual per-km distance traveled—by estimating

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 VBT_i + \beta_2 Dist_i + \beta_3 AveDist_i + \rho X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where $Dist_i$ is a measure of distance to the closest training center and β_2 captures the per-km travel costs incurred by moving the training center further from a respondent's house. Recall that since the training center location was randomly assigned, distance to the nearest training center ($Dist_i$) is exogenous as long as we condition on the average distance between a village and all other villages in our sample ($AveDist_i$).[19] We run variations of this specifi-

[18] As noted previously, it did not make sense to provide group transport in VBT villages. Therefore our treatment design is not fully cross-randomized (see Appendix Table B1), and in order to correctly estimate the VBT effect, we need to control for the group transport treatment. We do so in all specifications but suppress reporting it for expositional clarity except when we explicitly examine the impact of different design variations.

[19] To see why the $AveDist_i$ control is needed, consider an example of three villages being jointly randomized (one to VBT, two to nVBT). Imagine that two are within 1 km of each other, but the third is located 10 km from the others. It is clear that while each has an equal probability of being assigned to the VBT treatment, the respondents in the villages within 1 km of each other have a higher probability of having the training center being within 1 km

cation, including higher order polynomials in distance as well as discrete distance bins, to ensure that we properly account for the role of distance. In these specifications, we always control for $AveDist_i$ using the same functional form as used for $Dist_i$.

Since our design introduced exogenous variation in stipend, we can estimate the impact of money on take-up and compare it to the impact of VBT to determine economic magnitude. To do so we estimate

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 VBT_i + \beta_2 Dist_i + \beta_3 AveDist_i + \beta_4 Stipend + \rho X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

We can now determine the stipend amount needed to create the same impact on take-up as the VBT treatment by calculating $\frac{\beta_1}{\beta_4}$ and the "marginal rate of substitution" between distance and stipend with $\frac{\beta_2}{\beta_4}$.We also extend our analysis to the effects of our other treatment arms by including an additional indicator for each in our main specification in the equation

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 VBT_i + \beta_2 Info_i + \beta_3 Comm_i + \beta_4 GT_i + \beta_5 Dist_i + \beta_6 AveDist_i + \rho X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where VBT_i, $Dist_i$, and $AveDist_i$ are the same as they appear in equation 2; $Info_i$ is an indicator for the trainee engagement (TE) treatment, $Comm_i$ is an indicator for the community engagement (CE) treatment; and GT_i is an indicator for the group transport treatment. It is worth mentioning that α in this specification now represents the mean take-up in the nVBT baseline intervention villages (refer to Appendix Table B1) so that each β on a treatment indicator represents the difference in take-up between those villages and the treatment villages, controlling for distance.

Finally, we examine heterogeneous effects of the VBT treatment between different sub-

of their home. Moreover, to the extent that the farther away village varies on other characteristics (e.g. income, industry, etc.) that can impact course applications and enrollment, this can introduce a bias into our estimates if not controlled for. This is precisely what the $AveDist_i$ control accomplishes. In our example, it will assign a higher $AveDist_i$ value for the village that is further from the other two so that the distance term of interest ($Dist_i$) will only reflect the random component of the distance variation induced by our assignment. While we can compute $AveDist_i$ for different radii, we consider only the average distance of the village to all sample villages within 15 km (a reasonable radius beyond which travel is likely not feasible). We checked robustness of our results by using average distance to all villages within 5 km, 10 km, 20 km as well as averaging the distance to all sample village within the village's randomization grid. None of these alternative controls affected our main results, which is not surprising given that these controls themselves are rarely significant.

populations to better understand the nature of the effect. To do this, we estimate

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 VBT_i + \beta_2 Hetero_i + \beta_3 (VBT \times Hetero_i) + \beta_4 Dist_i + \beta_5 AveDist_i + \rho X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (5)$$

where $Hetero_i$ is an indicator variable for individual i belonging to the sub-population being considered. Though $Hetero_i$ is imperfect due to non-random assignment, we can interpret the results of this specification if certain demographic characteristics act as a "substitute" for the VBT treatment. For instance, if β_2 has the same sign as β_1 (i.e. positive) and β_3 the opposite sign (negative), it is likely that the factor in consideration plays a part in explaining the distance penalty. We discuss this interpretation further below.

4 Results

4.1 Distance Constraints & the Boundary Effect

We first establish the critical role that distance plays in women's decisions to take up skills enhancement opportunities. In doing so, we take advantage of our experimental design, which induces exogenous variation in both the placement of in-village training centers and (conditionally) the distance to the nearest training center for villages without an in-village training center.

Table 1 Panel A first examines the impact on take-up rates when a training center is set up in a village. We find large positive effects on all four take-up measures, including intent measures (voucher acceptance and voucher submission), course enrollment, and eventual course completion. The odd number columns present our basic specification, and the even number columns add a host of additional controls. As the measures of take-up move from intent to enrollment to completion, we find increasingly substantial impacts in both the absolute magnitude of the effect and its relative size. For voucher acceptance (i.e. an individual expresses intent to take a course), women in VBT villages show a 22 percentage points higher take-up than counterparts in nVBT villages (Column 1), which reflects a nearly 36 percent increase compared to nVBT reference villages (the "control" group). Women in VBT villages have 32 percentage points higher voucher submission rates (more than double the control mean), 34 percentage points higher course enrollment rates, and 27 percentage points higher course completion rates (these effects represent a three to four-fold increase relative to the control group). As the mean travel distance of a training center

for nVBT women is 9.6 km (6 miles), our results emphasize how severely travel can impact female access to training opportunities, even for relatively short distances.

While take-up differences between VBT and nVBT villages are striking, they do not explain why such severe distance penalties exist. For example, it is possible that large economic costs of travel could explain these magnitudes. Although we return to this possibility in Section 4.2, Table 1, Panels B and C shed further light on this, unpacking the distance penalties by examining its functional form.[20] Recall from Section 3.3 that since the location of a village training center is randomized, we can include distance controls in the basic specification in Panel A. Accounting for distance traveled allows us to separately identify the continuous per-km travel costs and any "boundary effect" (a penalty paid simply for leaving one's village for the training). Such boundary effects, unlike per-km costs, cannot be readily explained by the economic costs of travel, since there are no economic "tariffs" charged for crossing village boundaries. Panels B and C look at GPS distance (i.e. the straight-line distance) of the closest training center to the nVBT village's geographical centroid (this distance measure is defined as zero for households within VBT villages).[21] Panel B introduces a linear control for distance, while Panel C adds a quadratic term to allow for a concave per-km travel cost function. Both panels demonstrate that the distance penalties increases with travel distance; for example, Panel B shows that class completion rates drop by 2 percentage points for each additional km traveled. However, after accounting for distance, the village boundary effect persists, ranging from 10-22 percentage points for different take-up measures (a slightly smaller effect than Panel A's specification without distance). There is a persistent additional effect of (crossing) the village boundary above and beyond the economic costs of traveling captured through the per-km measure.

Figure 1 illustrates both the intercept shift in take-up resulting from the village boundary as well as the additional effect of distance on take-up for women traveling from other villages. Note that the non-parametric fit in the graph suggests that the boundary effect is likely to remain robust to functional forms of the distance term (more on this below). Together with the results in Panels B and C, our results offer striking evidence that the observed distance penalty contains non-economic or non-temporal costs related to travel, as simply crossing a village boundary does not impose any such discrete costs.

[20] Note that all regressions which include distance also include our control for remoteness, though they are suppressed in all the tables.

[21] We can also look at distance to closest two or three training centers, but doing so does not change our results. Therefore, it is the closest training center's distance that matters, and we will stick with that for the remaining analysis.

4.1.1 Robustness to Distance Metric

Before exploring the nature of these non-economic costs in subsequent sections, we will first address the possible overestimation of both the intercept term as well as the per-km travel costs due to using the straight-line measure of distance, which is, by definition, a lower bound to true travel distance. Aware of this concern during data collection, we additionally measured real travel distance by having surveyors physically travel the routes that a villager would most likely take (as detailed in Section 3.2 and Appendix A).Unlike the straight-line distance measure, measured travel distancecaptures the average distance a household had to travel *inside* their village to reach the training center. Controlling for distance with this added precision implies that the VBT coefficient captures more truly the (additional) effect of crossing the village boundary (and not just the zero distance intercept term) on take-up rates. Table 1, Panels D and E present our results using this more refined value of the average distance traveled by households to the nearest training center, either inside or outside their village. We find somewhat smaller per-km costs than in the straight-line distance case (i.e. the coefficient on the linear distance term in Panel D is somewhat smaller than that in Panel B), which we expected, since the travel distance measure is on average 1.5 times the straight-line distance measure. However, the boundary effect remains quite large, ranging from 12 to 22 percentage points in Panel D. Interestingly, in contrast to the straight-line distance measure, the travel distance measure captures a slight degree of non-linearity in the take-up-distance relationship (i.e. Panel E shows the quadratic specification fits better than the analogous one in Panel C). Allowing for the quadratic term and actual travel distance does attenuate the boundary effect somewhat, but across all take-up measures, it remains between 11 and 18 percentage points.

Together, the results in Table 1 show that the effect of crossing a village boundary is far from negligible. The effect is one-third to over a half (depending on the outcome and specification) of the total VBT effect reported in Panel A, and remains appreciably above a 10 percentage point increase. In Panel E, we see an average impact of 15 percentage points of crossing the boundary across all outcomes, suggesting that typically, around half of the total distance penalty is paid right at the point of leaving the village.[22]

[22] Appendix Table B6 reports regressions using an alternative cluster-based, rather than village-based, travel distance measure. We prefer the latter measure in Table 1, since the training center location was randomized at the village and not cluster level (i.e. we randomly selected which village received a training center but did not specify which exact location in the village received it, as this additional randomization would have raised logistical costs substantially). Therefore, while the *between-village* distance measure is exogenously assigned, the *between-cluster* measure is not guaranteed to be so. Nevertheless, we

4.1.2 Robustness to Functional Form

Both the per-km travel costs and boundary effect identified hold for the two different distance measures and in both linear and quadratic specifications. The boundary effect is robust to a range of more flexible functional forms, as table 2 shows.

Given that the boundary effect was reduced slightly in moving from the linear to quadratic distance controls (Table 1, Panel D compared to Panel E), Panel A of Table 2 allows the preferred travel distance measure to take polynomial forms up to a 5th order (controlling for a similar 5th order polynomial in $AveDist_i$). This exercise tests whether a highly flexible (and perhaps implausibly so) functional form in distance would substantially reduce the boundary effect estimated in Table 1. It does not, the VBT coefficient is largely unchanged, which suggests the high robustness of the boundary effect. Moreover, since the higher order terms in the polynomial are not individually significant, we conclude that the underlying relationship between distance and travel can be estimated as quadratic.

Panel B of Table 2 takes an alternative approach. Rather than assuming a smooth functional form in distance, Panel B flexibly controls for travel distance bin fixed effects. To do this, we first divide individuals from nVBT villages into decile bins based on their village's average travel distance to the training center. We exclude VBT villages when creating the distance thresholds for these bins so that the first bin is not too small. We then use the bin thresholds to categorize all individuals (from both VBT and nVBT villages) into a given travel distance bin (we control for analogous $AveDist_i$ bins using the bin cutoffs for the $Dist_i$ measure). This process ensures that an adequate number of individuals from villages both with and without training centers fall into each bin to calculate an impact of the village boundary. As in Table 2 Panel A, this more demanding specification shows similar boundary effects to the main regressions along all four stages of take-up.

Finally, Panel C of Table 2 takes this specification a step further by implementing what is akin to a "Regression Discontinuity" style design. Note that this is unnecessary for causal inference—distance is exogenous given our intervention design, so we obtain correct causal inference in our basic specification. However, in order to further minimize concerns about the true functional form of distance and its implication for the measured boundary effect, we restrict the comparison to those villages where a training center is located less than 4 km from the population center, either within the village boundary or outside (i.e. within the first two travel distance bins), so we are comparing households that face similar (and relatively

show that our results (for both linear and quadratic forms) remain essentially unchanged and qualitatively similar even if we use the (potentially endogenous) cluster-based measure.

small) travel distance to the training center. We also control for travel distance within this narrow bin—analogous to an RD design where one also controls parametrically for the running variable and looks for a "jump" at the discontinuity (i.e. the village boundary). Panel C of Table 2 shows that the boundary effect remains robust and is, in fact, even slightly larger. Figure 2 presents the results non-parametrically by plotting the distance means of each village within these bins, showing a clear gap in take-up between VBT and nVBT villages with similar travel distance. This final test is perhaps the starkest and most demanding test of the boundary effect and highlights how robust it is.

4.1.3 Additional Boundaries

While our results so far demonstrate the large, negative effect of crossing a village boundary on take-up rates, the village boundary is potentially just one of several invisible "boundaries" women may have to cross when leaving their households. Our focus on the village boundary is driven both by our prior belief that this is likely to be significant, but also by our ability to cleanly isolate the impact of this boundary through the experimental variation induced in our interventions. In this section we explore additional boundaries *within* the village and *outside* of the village. Our results for the former employ non-experimental variation. The latter exploits experimental variation arising from our design.

Within Village Boundaries: A typical village has several settlements—smaller groupings of households that signify sub-communities in the village—separated by empty or agricultural land; the median village in our sample has eight settlements.[23] Therefore settlements present a natural and potentially salient boundary. Using the same strategy as described in Section 4.1, we can estimate the impact of crossing a settlement border to reach a training center in addition to the effect of crossing the village border. Table 4 reports results similar to those in Table 1 and includes an additional indicator variable for a training center located within the individual's settlement (SBT). Since training centers were not randomly assigned to settlements within villages, these results should be interpreted with some caution.

Panel A shows that there is an additional SBT effect for all outcomes except voucher acceptance. Positioning the training center in a woman's own settlement leads to a 9-12 percentage points higher take-up rate over and above the 20-30 percentage point increase due to its presence in her village. For example, Column 7 shows that for course completion

[23]We use settlement definitions used in the national census exercise conducted by the Federal Bureau of Statistics of Pakistan.

rates, positioning a training center in a woman's settlement leads to a 33 percentage points higher enrollment (21 for the in-village effect and an additional 12 for the in-settlement effect). Panels B and C include linear and quadratic cluster-level travel distance controls to better isolate the settlement and village boundary effects and the per-km costs.[24] Overall the suggestive evidence of a settlement boundary effect is strongest and most robust for our final measures of take-up—course enrollment and completion.

Outside Village Boundaries: Apart from boundaries *within* a village, there are also boundaries outside one's village. For example, if a woman has to pass through multiple villages on her way to a training center, each additional village may present another boundary that could influence her take-up. Given our experimental design, the number of village borders between each pair of sending and receiving villages is also random. To explore the role of village borders, we used Google Maps to identify the likely routes that a woman could take to reach the closest VBT village and counted the number of villages that she would encounter en route (inclusive of her destination village). Panels D-F of Table 4 presents the results of regressing program take-up on the number of boundaries one has to cross to get to the training center. For ease of interpretation, we set the training villages (the VBT group) as the omitted category (hence the sign of the boundary effects will be reversed) and separate the villages without a training center based on how many village borders a woman would have to cross before reaching the training facility. Since we find that it is really only crossing the first border that matters, in our primary table we only consider one versus two and more borders. Our results are similar if we use alternative (finer or coarser) bin groupings.[25] Interestingly, and in contrast to the own-village boundary result, apart from voucher acceptance (the initial and least demanding form of take-up) where there is a suggestive effect of crossing additional (see Appendix Table B7) boundaries, there is no robust (adverse) impact of crossing additional village boundaries beyond the first (one's own) village boundary. In other words, it is the action of *leaving* one's vil-

[24] Recall that the cluster-level distance measure is based on a smaller (than settlement) grouping of households identified by our data collectors. Using it as the distance control allows to introduce finer variation.

[25] Appendix Table B7 also shows results where we divide the villages without a training center into roughly five equally sized bins, where we separately consider the effects of crossing one, two, three, four, or five and more borders. Note that these bins are "nested" for the sake of readability. Thus the first indicator "crossed one border or more" will take a value of 1 for all villages which did not have a training center (i.e. what we referred to as nVBT villages before). Therefore each subsequent measure captures the *additional* impact (if any) of crossing an *additional* border—which is what we are in fact interested in isolating. While we use travel distance in these tables, our results are similar if we use straight-line distance.

lage, rather than the number of villages one has to cross after the initial departure, that has a negative relationship with program take-up.

Together, our results present an interesting and nuanced picture. Boundaries at and within a village matter, whereas once a woman leaves her village, while distance traveled still matters (take-up drops with distance), additional (village) boundaries do not seem to have a detectable adverse impact. This provides further evidence that the distance penalties we observe arise from concerns that are generated as a women exits the confines of her community/village. We will further examine these and related factors in Section 4.3.

4.2 Economic Significance of the Boundary and Distance Constraints

Our experimental design allows us to leverage exogenous individual-level variation in the monthly stipend amount to estimate the economic magnitude of the distance and boundary effects. In order to do so, we first estimate how much take-up rates (for each of our four different measures) are impacted by an increase in stipend amounts. Using the resulting estimate of the causal impact of money paid on individual take-up rates, we can then calculate how much extra stipend must be offered to induce a similar take-up rate change as the distance and boundary effects.

Panel A of Table 3 shows the causal impact of stipend on take-up rates by including (exogenously assigned) monthly stipend amount in our primary empirical specification. A PKR 1,000 (~$10) increase in the monthly stipend raises take-up rates by 4, 5, 4, and 4 percentage points respectively for the four increasingly demanding take-up measures.

Panel B then translates the stipend effect into the monthly stipend amount needed to replicate the full effect of having in-village training. Women in the average village would have to be paid an additional PKR 6,308-7,951 per month to achieve the same level of take-up as women who had a training center in their village. This additional monthly stipend corresponds to 66-84% of average monthly household expenditures reported in our pre-training survey and would imply an additional transfer of PKR 25K-32K to each individual over the four-month training period.

Panel C separates the implied economic value of VBT treatment into the financial transfers needed to overcome the boundary effect and the per-km costs (using coefficients from Table 1, Panel D and Table 3, Panel A). We find that the additional stipend necessary to induce a woman to simply cross a village boundary is PKR 3,686-5,212 per month, approx-

imately the median monthly household non-food expenditures in our pre-treatment survey. Once past the boundary, she would then require PKR 273-402 per additional km traveled. Since we account for distance in this estimation (Table 1, Panel D), the boundary-crossing compensation does not represent compensation for economic (travel or time) costs, but rather an economic measure of the non-economic access barriers faced by women in our context.[26] To our knowledge this is the first precise estimate of the economic magnitude of such non-economic access barriers in the literature.

The boundary effect already implies that these costs are not readily reconciled with standard economic costs of travel and (opportunity cost of) time. However, we can go a step further and compare the stipend compensation estimated in Table 3 with plausible estimates of travel costs. To do this, we take advantage of the fact that our distance mapping exercise also measured commute and wait times for the various public transport facilities (bus, qingchi/auto-rickshaw , and motorbike) available in each sample village to travel to the (nearest) training center as well as the transport fares paid. Our results show that our stipend compensation amounts are substantially larger than (generous) estimates of travel costs (fare and time) when using public modes of transport.

We estimate that the median woman in our sample would incur additional costs of around PKR 1,500 per month if she were to travel outside her village for training using public qingchi (one of the most common modes of transport), compared to attending training in her own village. plus the opporuntity cost of commute, wait, and travel time for each trip valued at the prevailing hourly wage during peak labor season. Even using such generous assumptions on the opportunity cost of time, these numbers are a fourth to fifth of the compensatory stipend estimates obtained in Table 3, Panel A.

Moreover, our results suggest that even the per-km travel compensation (over and above the boundary-crossing compensation) may be hard to reconcile with standard economic costs. In order to see this, Appendix Table B5 presents reported data on actual fares (per trip) paid for different modes of transport. Columns 1 to 3 show the *additional* per-km fare that needs to be paid for the three public transport modes, which at PKR 57-73 per-km traveled each month are substantially smaller than the PKR 273-401 per-km extra compensation we estimated in Panel C of Table 3.

[26]These estimates are even larger if we include the settlement boundary effect we noted in Section 4.1.3. Appendix Table B8 uses the estimates from Panels A and B in Table 4 to provide the equivalent economic magnitude of crossing the village and settlement boundaries. For example, Panel A Column 8 shows that a household must be paid 7,689 PKR a month (5,119 for the in-village effect and an additional 2,570 for the in-settlement effect) to allow a woman to attend a training that is both outside her settlement and village.

4.3 Understanding & Addressing the Access Constraint

The previous sections have demonstrated the effect, size, and economic significance of the distance penalties in terms of both the per-km travel costs and the boundary effect. Our results also suggest that the boundary effect (and possibly the per-km costs as well) captures a cost other than traditional economic costs associated with travel. We now turn to experimental evidence from the (three) other interventions designed to address the distance-induced access constraints. While these interventions are of independent interest, they also shed light on what factors may underlie these distance barriers. We then examine the constraining factors further by using non-experimental variation to estimate heterogeneity in the boundary effect by individual and community attributes.

4.3.1 Enabling Access: Information, Social, and Transport Constraints

In this section, we provide experimental evidence on the impact of distinct interventions designed to alleviate three specific access barriers that could arise from information, social, and transportation concerns that are exacerbated when training is outside one's village. Three interventions were designed in consultation with the major local training service providers: (TE) a trainee engagement session conducted in each village to increase knowledge of what the training involved; (CE) a community engagement exercise to address social constraints by inviting community elders and others to a village-level meeting to discuss their concerns with the course; and (GT) ameliorating transportation concerns by providing secure, reliable and socially acceptable group transportation for women to attend training outside their villages.[27] The efficacy of these interventions (or lack thereof) sheds light on potential channels at play in generating the per-km distance effect and the boundary effect documented above.

Table 5 presents the impact of each of these treatments on our four take-up measures and allows us to contrast them with the per-km distance and boundary effects observed. We first consider informational failures. Addressing informational gaps as well as any related questions by potential trainees was a key part of the TE treatment. The lack of any discernible (positive) impact of TE across all of the take-up measures shows that information failures were unlikely to have been important factors behind access barriers. Moreover, because TE

[27] Importantly, both TE and CE are representative of a broad set of interventions in regular use by training organizations that have begun to attract attention from researchers (Klugman et al., 2014; Dean and Jayachandran, 2019; McKelway, 2020; Jayachandran, 2019).

was cross-randomized with village-based training, we can interact it with the VBT dummy to check whether information provision under TE was especially effective when the training was outside one's own village. As shown in Table B9, we find no interaction effects for TE. Our results suggest informational barriers were not salient in either VBT or nVBT villages—thus such factors contribute neither to the overall access constraints nor to the distance-related/village boundary effect.

The CE treatment variation added engagement with the wider (village) community in an effort to address any questions and concerns they might have. While CE did not have any impact on voucher submission, class enrollment or completion, it did have a fairly large but *negative* impact on voucher acceptance (8 to 9 percentage points). When we look at the fully interacted model (Table B9), we find that this negative impact of CE on voucher acceptance is driven entirely by villages where the training was outside the village (nVBT). CE suppresses voucher acceptance by over 19 percentage points in such villages. While the fact that this treatment did not improve eventual course completion is disheartening from a policy perspective,[28] these results are quite revealing in interpreting the access barriers we find. First, they demonstrate that social factors are at play (given TE had no negative effect and CE, which simply added wider community members to the engagement, did). Second, given the negative impact only occurs when the training course was located outside the village, this suggests that the social concerns were related specifically to a woman's leaving her village for the training (as opposed to social concerns regarding another aspect of the training). Third, the fact that the negative impact of CE does not arise for subsequent stages of take-up suggests the meetings raised concerns (earlier) that these women would have faced subsequently in any case (even before they were able to submit a voucher), i.e. the CE treatment dissuaded the subset of women who would have ultimately dropped out due to social concerns from even accepting the voucher.

Finally, we turn to the constraints that arise from transportation concerns. We find that the group transport (GT) intervention has a large, positive impact on all but the first stage of take-up (Table 5). For course completion the GT impact is roughly two-thirds the size of the village boundary effect. Providing appropriate group transport compensated for a sizable

[28] We should acknowledge that a stronger form of community engagement, perhaps one which lasted over a longer period and was more involved, could have been impactful. That said, these meetings were organized and delivered by local organizations that routinely conduct such mobilizations and followed best practices. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our results offer a sobering reminder that addressing social barriers, especially those that may entail changing (restrictive) social norms, is a difficult and costly exercise and one that may take months if not years to materialize.

fraction of the penalty that women faced when crossing the village boundary. Whatever (non-economic) factors are at play, providing safe, reliable, and socially acceptable group transport addressed them. Interestingly, the importance of such dedicated transport is consistent with our previous section where we estimated that the amount of stipend women needed to compensate them for travel outside the village. While we estimated the compensatory amount was 4-5 times the cost of *public* transport (fare plus opportunity cost of wait and travel time), it was comparable to the cost of travel via a *private* mode of transport. Specifically, using the fare estimates from Column 4 in Appendix Table B5, along with valuing commute time at the prevailing wage rate, we estimate that the median woman in our sample would incur additional costs of around PKR 5,000-6,000 a month if she were to travel to training on a private motorbike. This is close to the PKR 6.5-8K monthly stipend compensation we obtained in Table 3. This suggests that group transport likely helped by providing a dedicated, safe, reliable, and therefore socially acceptable mode of transport—much like a private transport mode would.

An alternate reason why group transport works (even when public transport services are available) is that by offering such a service, we may be capturing positive peer effects instead of transportation effects (i.e. as women travel to the training together, perhaps such pairing of women encourages them to overcome the [social] access barriers they face). While the fact that the stipend compensation needed is similar to the cost of private transport already suggests such group effects may not be first order, we can test this further by taking advantage of an additional individual-level randomization in which we also provided a voucher and stipend to the neighbors of a (randomly selected) subset of women. If peer effects are driving the positive GT results, we would expect the neighbor's offer to positively impact an individual's take-up decision. However, we find no such effect (Appendix Table B10), suggesting that peer effects cannot adequately explain the GT effect. In addition, we can also take advantage of the fact that while stipend varied at the individual level, there was also (random) variation in stipend across villages. Thus we can look at the effect of both the individual and average (village-level) stipend. We can see that the individual stipend positively affects take-up. If peer effects (at the larger village level) were important, one would expect the average stipend in a village (which affects village-level take-up) to have a positive impact on an individual's take-up over and above the effect of the stipend she received. However, Appendix Table B11 shows this is not the case, offering further evidence that peer effects are not salient in affecting take-up.

We can gain further insights into boundary effect by examining interactions between

GT and other (randomized) interventions. While we did not offer GT in VBT villages (doing so made little sense given the typically short within-village travel distances), we assigned both GT and CE simultaneously to some nVBT villages. Appendix Table B9 shows that the interaction between GT and community engagement is positive and marginally significant at the voucher acceptance stage (p-value of 0.12). Recall that the negative impact of community meetings at the voucher acceptance stage was not present for women in VBT villages. Analogously, we see that this negative effect of community engagement on take-up is also mitigated for nVBT villages that received group transport. Community engagement only negatively impacted voucher acceptance in villages that received neither a training center (in the village) nor reliable transport, suggesting that these services mitigated whatever objections to training the community members raised. The specific form of group transport—it was designed with feedback from the community and had community-based (male) drivers—could have played a key role in addressing the non-economic and community-norm barriers women face in traveling outside their communities.

4.3.2 Heterogeneity of the Boundary Effect by Pre-treatment Characteristics

Our previous results—the negative impact of community engagement on voucher acceptance, the ameliorating impact of group transport, and the interactions between the two—present experimental evidence on the importance of a social channel. We can also shed further light on the underlying channels by examining how the boundary effect varies by pre-treatment community-, household-, and individual-level factors.

This heterogeneity analysis is suggestive as it utilizes non-experimental variation and was not something we had anticipated prior to analyzing the main experimental results in the paper. However, in light of the large and robust boundary effect, we feel this exercise provides additional insight into the social factors that constrain women. Moreover, we filed a pre-analysis plan to discipline to this heterogeneity analysis.[29] While this runs the risk

[29]The heterogeneity across various dimensions was pre-registered after we completed analysis of the experimentally-induced variation: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4068. We report the full set of results in Appendix C. Our pre-analysis plan specified the potential channels through which the boundary effect is likely to vary, such as gender equality, perception of safety, and socioeconomic status. Our subsequent analysis closely followed the plan and examined all the relevant channels within each category. Furthermore, for each channel, we code the relevant variables in different ways to test the robustness of our findings. Moreover, we also grouped variables into indices (and also presented results by each component variable) to provide more conservative estimates. The only result that was run before filing the pre-analysis plan was heterogeneity of the boundary effect by ethnic fragmentation.

of presenting a laundry list of mediating factors, in order to ensure transparency, Table 6 presents the full set of results noted in our pre-analyis plan. Each row in the table shows the interaction term between the VBT dummy (boundary effect) and the factor of interest (except Panel B, Row 2). In order to facilitate comparison across the rows, whenever the (interaction) variable in question is continuous, we standardize it. Binary indicator variables are kept as is. The full regressions and detailed discussion of each factor are in Appendix C, and their specific locations are mentioned in the last column of Table 6. Here we only summarize some of the key findings.

Our first set of results (Table 6, Panel A) confirm that GT treatment was not simply picking up a lack of transport options in the village. Despite having variation across villages in public transport availability, the boundary effect does not vary by how "connected" (Panel A, Row 1) or developed it is (Panel A, Row 2). In contrast, village-level ethnic diversity does mitigate the boundary effect (Panel B, Row 1), but the degree of ethnic overlap between a (nVBT) village and the one that hosts the training matters only for voucher acceptance and not any of the subsequent take-up measures (Panel B, Row 2). Together, the last two results suggest the ethnic diversity heterogeneity is driven by the sending community's acceptance of women traveling outside (perhaps due to exposure to more diverse groups in the village), and not ethnic similarity to the destination village.

Table 6, Panel C considers whether a household's socioeconomic status mediates the boundary effect. Our results again support how the boundary effect is driven by non-economic factors. Were economics paramount, one may have expected women who lack financial resources to be the least able to travel outside their village. Instead, we find the exact opposite—it is women from poorer households who are subject to a *smaller* boundary effect (Rows 1 to 3), with similar though weaker results for less educated women (Row 4). This is consistent with existing research that social status (which may be at risk when a woman travels outside her village) is more an issue for richer/higher caste families (Sathar and Kazi, 2000; Mumtaz and Salway, 2005; Mumtaz et al., 2012; Jacoby and Mansuri, 2015).

Table 6, Panel D then considers a range of factors about women's role and perceptions within the household. Our results generally suggest that women who face greater responsibilities in the household (Rows 1 and 3), lack agency (Row 4), and/or are unmarried (Row 6) face larger boundary effects. While male beliefs about men's superiority has somewhat of an (adverse) impact, female beliefs about men's superiority does not matter (Rows 7 and 8) . Moreover, crossing the village boundary is harder for women whose male household

members express an interest in working elsewhere (Row 9), while woman's willingness to travel has no effect (Row 10). These results suggest that men's attitude seems to take precedence over women's preferences in this context, since it is men's opinion (and likely control) that affects women's mobility. This is perhaps even more starkly illustrated when considering a woman's own desire to enroll (Row 11): women who express greater demand for the course in fact face a *greater* boundary effect. Finally, Panel E checks whether women's mobility constraints arise on account of safety concerns and finds little support that this is the case.

In summary, our examination of the boundary effect lends support to our hypothesis that distance constraints, especially the boundary effect, are driven primarily by non-economic, non-informational, and societal-level factors. In our setting, women who feel they enjoy more agency, have lower socioeconomic status, and come from ethnically diverse communities, are better able to overcome such societal constraints.

5 Conclusion

Our paper highlights the importance of access constraints women face in emerging economies, especially those related to travel outside of their communities. We find that these barriers are large and not readily reconcilable with economic factors and the opportunity cost of time associated with travel and document a stark "boundary effect," whereby training take-up for women falls substantially when they cross a (virtual) village boundary. As women continue past the boundary, they also experience per-km travel costs substantially greater than standard economic costs would imply. Our results suggest that these large non-economic costs are likely generated by conservative societal constraints that women face when leaving their own community. Consistent with this, we find that these access barriers are less salient for women who enjoy greater agency, have lower socioeconomic status, and reside in more diverse communities. Furthermore, these barriers are ameliorated by providing safe, reliable, and socially acceptable group transport for women.

These barries have important welfare and distributional consequences for rural women and their households. Our ongoing work shows that the skills training studied here has economic and non-economic benefits for the trainees and their households. And the same access issues women face in acquiring skills may also prevent them from deploying skills. In ongoing work we find that connecting females trainees to external-to-village (input and output) markets substantially increases their returns (Cheema et al., 2019).

Our analysis highlights a critical program design trade-off. Distributing training and other services to small rural villages is expensive (one loses economies of scale and has to pay for more travel and distribution of training inputs). Yet without compensating women for the non-economic costs of travel, take-up will be quite low outside the immediate area around a training facility. By cross-randomizing service accessibility and stipend, implementers can quantify such tradeoffs to make better informed program design decisions.

More broadly, our paper also shows that while it may be quite hard to change societal constraints in the short run, there is room to work creatively within them. Although our efforts to work with the community to directly address their concerns regarding female mobility had limited impact, providing a community-vetted and socially acceptable transport service for women to travel outside their village did help mitigate the boundary effect.[30] What remains to be seen is whether doing so ultimately changes these societal barriers and attitudes in the longer run. We hope to shed further light on this in subsequent work.

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[30]Preliminary cost-benefit calculations suggests that our projects costs are quite comparable (in achieving similar take-up rates) whether we set up a training center in a village, or arrange appropriate group transport for them to do so (the latter is a bit higher). In contrast, paying women an additional stipend to travel to another village is substantially more expensive (about 30-40% higher). Since our group transport was not done at scale or cost-efficiently relative to the village-based training, it is plausible that the transport option may ultimately offer the most cost-effective solution, especially if the increased mobility generates other (longer-term) benefits.

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Main Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Effect of Distance on Take-up



Figure 2: Outcome Mean by Distance (Travel Distance to Training Center <= 4 km)



Table 1: Effect of VBT

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Boundary Effect only – No Distance Measure								
Village Based Training	0.22***	0.23***	0.32***	0.33***	0.34***	0.35***	0.27***	0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Linear specification – Distance Measure 1: Straight-Line distance								
Village Based Training	0.11**	0.09*	0.19***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.19***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Straight-line Distance	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.9e-03)	(4.9e-03)	(4.0e-03)	(3.9e-03)	(3.3e-03)	(3.1e-03)
Panel C: Quadratic specification – Distance Measure 1: Straight-Line distance								
Village Based Training	0.21***	0.22***	0.20***	0.24***	0.18***	0.23***	0.15***	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Straight-line Distance	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$(\text{Straight-line Distance})^2$	-2.6e-03**	-3.1e-03**	-2.2e-04	-1.2e-03	7.5e-04	-1.7e-04	8.6e-04	7.5e-05
	(1.3e-03)	(1.2e-03)	(1.0e-03)	(1.0e-03)	(9.2e-04)	(9.4e-04)	(7.1e-04)	(7.4e-04)
Panel D: Linear specification – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(4.2e-03)	(4.1e-03)	(3.1e-03)	(3.2e-03)	(2.6e-03)	(2.7e-03)	(2.1e-03)	(2.2e-03)
Panel E: Quadratic specification – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.15***	0.16***	0.11**	0.14***	0.15***	0.18***	0.12***	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01	1.5e-03	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$(\text{Travel Distance})^2$	-2.9e-04	-6.7e-04	1.1e-03***	9.2e-04**	1.0e-03**	8.7e-04**	9.0e-04**	7.1e-04**
	(5.2e-04)	(5.0e-04)	(4.4e-04)	(4.3e-04)	(4.2e-04)	(4.0e-04)	(3.6e-04)	(3.4e-04)
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Mean of nVBT	0.61	0.63	0.24	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.08
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table 2: Alternative Distance Controls

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Fifth order polynomial of travel distance								
VBT	0.14***	0.17***	0.11**	0.15***	0.16***	0.19***	0.13***	0.16***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
(Travel Distance)^2	-0.02	-0.01	-1.6e-03	1.9e-03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Travel Distance)^3	1.9e-03	8.1e-04	1.4e-04	-2.8e-04	-9.6e-04	-1.2e-03	-7.9e-04	-1.4e-03
	(2.2e-03)	(2.2e-03)	(1.8e-03)	(1.8e-03)	(1.5e-03)	(1.5e-03)	(1.3e-03)	(1.3e-03)
(Travel Distance)^4	-1.0e-04	-4.0e-05	8.9e-07	2.0e-05	6.1e-05	7.0e-05	5.0e-05	7.8e-05
	(1.1e-04)	(1.2e-04)	(9.1e-05)	(9.1e-05)	(7.6e-05)	(7.7e-05)	(6.3e-05)	(6.4e-05)
(Travel Distance)^5	1.9e-06	7.2e-07	-1.3e-07	-4.2e-07	-1.2e-06	-1.4e-06	-1.0e-06	-1.5e-06
	(2.0e-06)	(2.1e-06)	(1.6e-06)	(1.6e-06)	(1.3e-06)	(1.4e-06)	(1.1e-06)	(1.1e-06)
Panel B: Distance bins								
VBT	0.10**	0.13***	0.11**	0.14***	0.16***	0.19***	0.13***	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Bin 2	-0.14***	-0.09*	-0.18***	-0.15***	-0.12***	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Bin 3	0.05	0.10*	-0.04	-0.01	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08*	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Bin 4	-0.18***	-0.15**	-0.21***	-0.19***	-0.16***	-0.15***	-0.12**	-0.10*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Bin 5	-0.06	-0.02	-0.22***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.13***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Bin 6	-0.15**	-0.13*	-0.22***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.13***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Bin 7	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.32***	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.20***	-0.21***	-0.15***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Bin 8	-0.13**	-0.11*	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.28***	-0.27***	-0.23***	-0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Bin 9	-0.28***	-0.25***	-0.37***	-0.34***	-0.33***	-0.29***	-0.25***	-0.21***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Bin 10	-0.20***	-0.19**	-0.31***	-0.30***	-0.25***	-0.23***	-0.20***	-0.18***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Regression discontinuity-style design								
VBT	0.21***	0.24***	0.10*	0.15***	0.14**	0.20***	0.11**	0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01	3.4e-03	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel A-B Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Panel C Obs.	3250	2956	3250	2956	2955	2679	2955	2679
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table 3: Economic Magnitude of the Treatment Effect: Implied Treatment-Cash Tradeoff

	(1) Voucher Acceptance	(2) Voucher Submission	(3) Class Enrollment	(4) Class Completion
Panel A: Regression results				
Stipend (000s in PKR)	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Panel B: Economic Magnitudes				
VBT Magnitude (in PKR)	6308***	7050***	7951***	6497***
	(1301)	(1049)	(1154)	(8781)
Panel C: Economic Magnitudes with Distance				
VBT Magnitude (PKR)	3686***	4040***	5212***	4495***
	(1161)	(951)	(997)	(800)
Distance Magnitude (PKR)	343***	402***	369***	273***
	(139)	(83)	(74)	(59)

Table 4: Additional Boundaries

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Within Village Boundaries: Boundary Effect only								
Village Based Training	0.22***	0.23***	0.28***	0.29***	0.28***	0.30***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Settlement Based Training	0.01	0.01	0.09***	0.09***	0.11***	0.11***	0.12***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Within Village Boundaries: Cluster-level travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.14***	0.15***	0.16***	0.17***	0.18***	0.12***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Settlement Based Training	-0.01	-0.01	0.06*	0.05*	0.08***	0.08**	0.10***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cluster-level Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(3.6e-03)	(3.5e-03)	(2.8e-03)	(2.8e-03)	(2.5e-03)	(2.4e-03)	(1.9e-03)	(2.0e-03)
Panel C: Outside Village Boundaries: Boundary Effect only								
Crossing 1st Boundary	-0.14***	-0.17***	-0.29***	-0.31***	-0.31***	-0.34***	-0.25***	-0.27***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Crossing 2 or more Boundaries	-0.09*	-0.07	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel D: Outside Village Boundaries: Travel distance								
Crossing 1st Boundary	-0.09*	-0.11**	-0.20***	-0.22***	-0.24***	-0.26***	-0.20***	-0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Crossing 2 or more Boundaries	-0.05	-0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(4.3e-03)	(4.3e-03)	(3.2e-03)	(3.2e-03)	(2.6e-03)	(2.7e-03)	(2.1e-03)	(2.3e-03)
Panel A Obs.	4841	4841	4841	4841	4841	4841	4841	4841
Panels B Obs.	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691
Panels C-D Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table 5: Treatment Breakdown

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.16***	0.11**	0.14***	0.15***	0.18***	0.13***	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Community Engagement	-0.09***	-0.10***	1.4e-03	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trainee Engagement	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Transport	0.04	0.04	0.08**	0.08**	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-4.8e-03	1.5e-03	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$(\text{Travel Distance})^2$	-3.7e-04	-6.7e-04	1.1e-03***	9.2e-04**	1.0e-03**	8.7e-04**	8.8e-04**	7.1e-04**
	(5.0e-04)	(5.0e-04)	(4.3e-04)	(4.3e-04)	(4.0e-04)	(4.0e-04)	(3.4e-04)	(3.4e-04)
Mean of nVBT	0.614	0.625	0.241	0.254	0.121	0.129	0.076	0.081
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects

	(1) Voucher Acceptance	(2) Voucher Submission	(3) Class Enrollment	(4) Class Completion	(5) Appendix Table
Panel A: Village Connectivity					
(1) VBT × Availability of	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	C1
Transport Facilities	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
(2) VBT × Availability of	-0.10**	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	C2
Non-transport Facilities	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
Panel B: Ethnic Diversity					
(1) VBT × Standardized	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03*	C3
Ethnic Fragmentation Index	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
(2) Inter-Village Ethnic	-0.05***	-0.01	2.0e-03	8.7e-04	C4
Difference	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Panel C: Socioeconomic Status					
(1) VBT × Standardized	0.04**	0.03*	0.01	0.02*	C5
Log. HH Monthly Income	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
(2) VBT × HH Income	-0.07**	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.08***	C6
in Village's Bottom 30%	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
(3) VBT × HH Asset Index	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.09***	C7
in Village's Bottom 30%	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
(4) VBT × Has Never	-0.09**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	C8
Been to School	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Panel D: Female Agency					
(1) VBT × Standardized	0.03*	0.04***	0.06***	0.06***	C9
Household Size	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
(2) VBT × At Least One Male	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02	C14
HH Member Away for 3 Months	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
(3) VBT × At Least One Female	0.21**	0.23***	0.27***	0.24***	C15
HH Member Away for 3 Months	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	
(4) VBT × Standardized	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.04***	-0.05***	C16
Domestic Influence Index	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
(5) VBT × Standardized	0.01	0.01	0.01	2.3e-03	C22
Business Influence Index	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
(6) VBT × Married	-0.05*	-0.07**	-0.10***	-0.12***	C31
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
(7) VBT × Standardized PCA of	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.05***	C32
Male Belief in Men's Superiority	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
(8) VBT × Standardized PCA of	2.1e-03	2.8e-03	0.01	0.02	C33
Female Belief in Men's Superiority	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
(9) VBT × Man Open to	0.06	0.10***	0.10***	0.07**	C34
Traveling for Work	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
(10) VBT × Woman Open to	-1.5e-03	0.02	0.07	0.01	C35
Traveling for Work	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	
(11) VBT × Identified Female	0.03	0.07**	0.09***	0.10***	C36
Very Likely to Enroll	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Panel E: Safety					
(1) VBT × Standardized	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	C38
Insecurity PCA Index	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	

Online Appendices

Appendix A: Program and Data Details

Early Pilot Work: Understanding Access Constraints

The design of the program we study in the paper was based on our prior work with PSDF. The first major undertaking of our collaboration was a large-scale baseline survey exercise of over 11,000 households in the program region. This exercise aimed to understand the demand for skills and the specific access constraints faced by potential program participants. To develop a holistic understanding of the local skills and labor markets, we conducted village and employer surveys in each of the program districts in addition to the household surveys. The exercise revealed significant latent demand for skills acquisition from both households and employers. Over 92% of households indicated their willingness to nominate at least one male and female member for skills training. Among those nominated, 96% of men and 97% of women reported a desire to acquire skills, and two thirds of households reported a (high) willingness to send the nominated household member to a PSDF training in the next year. Furthermore, we found that households selected members for the training course overwhelmingly according to highest earning potential (rather than according to having highest needs, being most liked, or being currently unemployed), suggesting that households took labor market returns seriously and expected high value from the training when nominating members (Cheema et al., 2012a).

Our baseline survey also revealed that the household members nominated for vocational training clearly expected financial gains from acquiring skills. The nominees reported a high wage premium for high-skilled jobs compared to low-skills jobs, ranging from PKR 7,135 to PKR 17,774 (Cheema et al., 2012a). This expected wage premium was largest for those who were unemployed and looking for work (which constitutes nearly half of unemployed women), reflecting a high level of interest in training among this population. Moreover, individuals also recognized non-economic returns to basic skills, such as enhanced degree of political engagement, ability to exercise political rights, and health status. As noted in the paper, this is consistent with the results obtained in our ongoing work which show high returns to the training (Cheema et al., 2019).

Based on the high demand for and expectations of high return from skills, PSDF launched the first of its pilot programs, Skills for Employability (SFE), in late 2011. SFE offered a variety of training courses to both (urban and rural) men and women. Despite the large

expressed demand for training, CERP's evaluation revealed low take-up. Take-up was particularly low for females. Only 7% of women offered vouchers for training ended up enrolling in courses, and only 3% of women completed the course (Cheema et al., 2012b). Even fewer women who enrolled came from poor and vulnerable households and/or lived farther from training centers. Through field visits and analytical work, we found that physical distance to the training center arose as one of the main reasons for lack of enrollment in or completion of skills training programs. Moreover, close to half of the targeted trainees that refused to participate in the SFE program identified distance as the primary constraint. These findings raised concerns that the sub-populations of interest (specifically, poor, rural, and vulnerable women) were not sufficiently benefiting from the training opportunities being provided.

Using the lessons learned from the first training rollout (the SFE program), PSDF launched a small sample pilot in 2012-13, Skills for Market - Phase A (SFM-A), specifically targeting rural women in 52 of the villages originally surveyed in the 2011 baseline surveys. In the pilot, we offered training courses in tailoring, rural dairy products, and home decoration. The pilot was designed to specifically address constraints from distance and social norms. Distance to the training center was reduced by placing the training center in the village, and social norms were addressed through focus groups that encouraged women to participate by stressing its usefulness. Initial results showed these design innovations were promising: women who had training centers located inside their villages had the highest enrollment rates, followed by women who participated in the focus groups, while enrollment rates stayed low for women who were only informed of the program's existence. Furthermore, the highest completion rates were among women who took the tailoring training course, signaling a clear preference for tailoring among other vocational skills. This preference matches the baseline survey, which found almost three quarters of all women nominated for the training preferred to acquire skills related to garments and textiles. While the pilot was conducted on a small scale, these findings subsequently informed the design of the program studied in the paper. The Skills for Market - Phase B (SFM-B) program was designed and then rolled out in 2013-14 in a larger sample of villages with additional design variations to address the constraints identified by these earlier pilots.

Data Details & Sources

The Figure below provides a timeline of all the surveys conducted followed by details of each data collection exercise.

Figure A1: Time of Data Collection Activities



- **Household Baseline Survey:** During this initial visit, households were provided with course and training booklets in order to inform them about the training program and stipend. Additionally, each household was given a survey to collect pre-treatment demographic characteristics of households, as well as solicit nominations from each household for a member to receive training. Additional questions were asked of nominated individuals concerning their demographic characteristics, as well as questions related to their previous experience with stitching. We also recorded the geo-coordinates of each household, which allows us to measure the straight-line distance from the house to the nearest training center. We then implemented treatments according to the household's treatment group.

- **Voucher Delivery Visit:** After treatment activities had been concluded, we revisited each household to deliver training vouchers to the respondent nominated in the baseline survey. During this visit, we reminded households of the female member they had nominated for the program, confirmed her eligibility, and offered her a printed voucher, in her name, to attend the training. She was notified that due to a limited number of seats, the voucher does not ensure a spot in the course, but it will greatly increase her chance for successful enrollment if she submits it to the training center. Thus we elicited our first measure of take-up, voucher acceptance, when an eligible female identified the location of the training center which she wanted to attend and accepted the offer of provisional course enrollment. We recorded acceptance rates at the time of delivery and later confirmed them through the follow-up survey. Since accepting the voucher only required an expression of interest in the course, not a formal commitment, we consider voucher acceptance the least demanding measure of take-up. Respondents were also asked about the various treatment activities that

had occurred in their village in order to ensure that activities had been properly carried out and advertised. Households that wished to switch their nominated member were allowed to do so at this point. For these households an additional baseline survey was conducted with the new nominated member to collect their pre-treatment demographic characteristics.

- **Voucher Submission Lists:** Households that accepted their voucher were told to submit their vouchers within a two-week time frame to their training center of choice. A list of all submitted vouchers was then given to us by each training center. This generated our voucher submission outcome—a measure of whether respondents actually submitted their vouchers to the training center for enrollment. Each voucher had a unique ID associated with the household, easily identifying the household and individual who submitted the voucher through training service providers' administrative data. We again confirmed all voucher submission with respondents during the follow-up survey.

- **Initial Enrollment Lists:** As the training was open to all women in the village, we also received applications from self-applicants outside of our sample (i.e. women who opted to register themselves for training in the absence of targeted information). Since the amount of submitted vouchers and applications at times exceeded the training center capacity (20 students per center), we conducted a random ballot to ensure a fair and transparent allocation of slots to applicants without compromising the evaluation. Applicants were therefore given a randomized sort order and categorized as either "admitted" (enrolled in the program) or "waitlisted" (trainees who we kept as a backup in case admitted trainees dropped out). Two and a half weeks after the voucher submission deadline, we announced the enrollment status of applicants for training by posting the list of admitted and waitlisted applicants at all training centers on the course start date. To ensure all admitted applicants were aware of their admission status and to record their intention to enroll, we visited the homes of all successful applicants in the enrollment verification phase. During this period, the field staff also visited the training center to independently record trainees' attendance. For the first 12 days of class, each training center provided us with a student attendance list. Admitted students who were not attending class were removed from the roster, and those on the waitlist were admitted. Each day we contacted these newly admitted students and sent the training centers an updated roster in order to

ensure the waitlist order was properly followed. These detailed lists not only allow us to track which respondents were admitted through the ballot, but also track those respondents who ultimately chose to enroll. Respondents who remained in class past the closure of this admission process were considered to have enrolled in the class. However, an individual was not considered enrolled if she attended some classes but stopped attending before the admission process closed. This forms our third measure of take-up—course enrollment.

- **Monthly Attendance Audits:** Once the class enrollment lists were finalized at the end of enrollment verification phase, PSDF initiated its independent monitoring process, which sent monitoring staff to each training center once per month until the course concluded. This monthly monitoring was logistically necessary to ensure that stipends were only disbursed to those still attending class, but these visits additionally provided detailed information on how long each respondent remained in the program and eventual course completion status. Consequently, we can easily identify which trainees had satisfactory attendance (80%) through the course's completion. We also confirmed each individual's class completion status through the follow-up survey. This provided our fourth and final measure of take-up.

- **Household Follow-up Survey:** Five months after all training activities had ended, we revisited each household to administer a follow-up survey. The main purpose of this survey was to gather updated information of respondents' post-treatment demographic characteristics, which will be used in another study to measure the training program's impact. However, we also used this opportunity to ask respondents about each of their take-up statuses. We use this information to confirm the statuses determined from the administrative data gathered above.

- **Cluster-level Distance Survey:** The survey was designed to measure distance from households' location to the closest training centers accounting for the actual routes used to travel between villages. Households were grouped into clusters, and a map was then made of each village demarking these clusters. Routes were then traced on each map for all means of transport: private modes (walk, cycle, motorcycle, a rickshaw-like vehicle called qingchi, and car), public modes (bus, qingchi and motorcycle), and group transport. Refer to Figure A2 below for an example of a map.

  Following the paths marked on the maps, enumerators measured the distance from

each cluster to the training center using a motorcycle and an odometer. However, when there was evidence that the route taken using a motorcycle would differ from the one using another private mode, we also computed the distance for that specific means of transport.

The approach to calculate distance varied by the means of transport and the type of cluster. Three types of clusters were identified: clusters within a VBT village that contained the training center (special clusters); clusters that did not host a training center and belong to a VBT village (non-special clusters); and clusters from nVBT villages.

1. Special clusters: To measure the distance to the center location by private transportation, the enumerators selected four random and geographically dispersed households in the cluster and measured their distance to the training center. The cluster-level distance consisted of the average of these four distances. As these clusters hosted the training center, there was no public transport needed and hence no corresponding measure of distance.

2. Non-special clusters: Distance by private transportation is measured from the cluster boundary to the training center of the village. In the case of public transportation, we calculated the distance in tranches: i) first connecting route: cluster boundary to the nearest bus/motorcycle/qingchi stop; ii) route taken by bus/motorcycle/qingchi to the drop-off point; and iii) second connecting route: from the drop-off point to the training center.

3. Clusters from nVBT villages: Distance by private transportation was calculated in tranches and then added up: i) from the cluster boundary to the boundary of the nVBT village where the cluster is in, ii) from the nVBT village boundary to a VBT village boundary, and iii) from the VBT village boundary to the training center. In a similar manner, distance by public transportation consists of the sum of three legs: i) first connecting route: cluster boundary to the nearest bus/motorcycle/qingchi stop; ii) route taken by bus/motorcycle/qingchi to the drop-off point; iii) second connecting route: from the drop-off point to the training center. For Group Transport, we calculated two tranches and then added them up: i) connecting route: cluster boundary to the pick-up point in the village; and ii) route taken by the Group transport provider from the pick-up point to the training center.

To get a better sense of transportation costs, we calculated the cost of fuel and the fare for using each means of public transport.[31] We also estimated the time cost of commuting by converting the distance into time terms for each mode of transport. In the case of public transport time calculations, we included estimates of waiting times at bus, qingchi, and motorcycle stops, which were measured by having enumerators ask two individuals waiting at each stop what their average wait times were.

Figure A2: Map for Cluster-level Distance Survey

[31] We calculated the cost of fuel by getting prices from the closest fuel supplier to each village. To estimate the fare for each public transport (bus, qingchi, and motorcycle), we asked the corresponding driver about the one-way fare for the relevant segment of the journey.

Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables

Table B1: Village and Household Count by Treatment Branch

	Village Based Training	non-Village Based Training
Baseline Intervention	42 (1052)	27 (692)
Trainee Engagement	39 (980)	27 (663)
Community Engagement	27 (687)	27 (704)
Group Transport		27 (704)
Group Transport + Comm. Engage.		27 (672)

Table B2: Village and Household Count by Stipend Bucket and Amount

Top-Up Amount (PKR)	Household Count
0	2,563
500	280
1000	413
1500	563
2000	544
2500	529
3000	406
3500	419
4000	293
4500	144

Table B3: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Household Variables:				
Monthly Income (000s in PKR)	11.56	7.00	0.00	150.00
Size	6.57	2.87	1.00	31.00
Punjabi	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
Asset Index	-2.1e-03	0.96	-1.13	9.56
Trainee Variables:				
Married	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00
Has Formal Education	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Paid Work	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Able to Stitch	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Stitched Last Month	0.06	0.23	0.00	1.00
Standardized Influence Index: Domestic Decisions	-3.4e-03	1.00	-1.45	1.04
Standardized Influence Index: Business Decisions	-1.9e-03	1.01	-1.97	1.39
Village/Distance Variables:				
Straight-Line Distance (KM)	3.22	3.64	0.00	16.17
Cluster-level Travel Distance (KM)	6.14	5.59	0.04	36.20
Travel Distance (KM)	6.10	5.29	0.17	24.21
Outcome Variables:				
Voucher Acceptance	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
Voucher Submission	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Class Enrollment	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Class Completion	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00

Figure B1: Female Mobility in South Asia and MENA







Figure B1 – Continued







Balance Tables

Table B4: Treatment Balance Table – VBT vs. nVBT

	(1) Mean of nVBT	(2) Mean of VBT - nVBT
Household and Village Variables:		
Monthly Income (000s)	11.58	-0.05
	(0.19)	(0.30)
Monthly Expenditure (000s)	10.00	-0.05
	(0.20)	(0.29)
Asset Index	-2.1e-03	-4.0e-03
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Household Size	6.60	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.09)
Household Head Is Punjabi	0.47	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.06)
No Household Member Is Sick	0.45	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
At Least 1 Male Away for 3 Months or More	0.12	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
At Least 1 Female Away for 3 Months or More	0.02	2.7e-03
	(2.5e-03)	(4.0e-03)
Suffered from Crimes in Recent Months	0.05	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic Fragmentation Index	0.12	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Ethnic Polarization Index	0.23	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Number of NGOs at Work	1.00	-0.04
	(0.08)	(0.13)
Has Access to Public Transport Stops	0.57	1.1e-03
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Has Access to Non-Transport Facilities	0.68	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Total Number of Signal Bars	16.44	0.16
	(0.45)	(0.69)
Petrol Price (Rupee per Liter)	82.02	-0.07
	(0.29)	(0.44)
P-value of Joint Test	0.12	

Table B4 – Continued

	(3) Mean of nVBT	(4) Mean of VBT - nVBT
Trainee Variables:		
Age	29.67	0.92**
	(0.25)	(0.38)
Married	0.69	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Number of Children under Age 9	1.88	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Mobile Phone Ownership	0.14	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
PCA Influence over Domestic Decisions	-0.03	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)
PCA Influence over Business Decisions	0.03	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.06)
PCA Female Belief in Male Superiority	0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.06)
In Good or Very Good Physical Health	0.82	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
K6 Mental Health Scale	20.75	0.08
	(0.23)	(0.33)
Has Formal Education	0.35	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Has Never Been to School	0.24	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Has Basic Literacy	0.42	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Stitched Last Month	0.05	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Able to Stitch	0.33	1.1e-03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Does Paid Work	0.32	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Confident in Finding Paid Work	3.31	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Does Chores	0.63	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Financial Satisfaction (0-10)	6.61	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.11)
Likely or Very Likely to Enroll in Training	0.73	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Considers Rule of Law Operative	0.24	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Considers Crime Rate Increasing	0.37	1.1e-03
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Trusts the Police	0.22	3.3e-03
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trusts the Courts	0.28	-3.7e-03
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trusts Government Health Services	0.82	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trusts Education Services	0.76	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
P-value of Joint Test	0.12	

Table B5: Travel Costs and Distance

	Bus Fare	Public Motorcycle Fare	Public Qingchi Fare	Private Motorcycle Fare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance and One-Way Fare (Linear)				
Travel Distance (KM)	1.69***	1.50***	1.29***	4.05***
	(0.50)	(0.38)	(0.18)	(1.48)
Constant	10.34***	18.45***	11.76***	90.09***
	(1.23)	(2.06)	(0.71)	(10.61)
Obs.	505	255	593	255
Average Travel Fare	19.32	26.22	18.27	111.00
R Squared	0.33	0.28	0.46	0.10

Additional Robustness Checks

Table B6: Cluster-Level Distance

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cluster-level travel distance								
Panel A: Linear specification								
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.18***	0.20***	0.22***	0.16***	0.18***
	(3.6e-02)	(3.6e-02)	(3.6e-02)	(3.6e-02)	(3.2e-02)	(3.2e-02)	(2.6e-02)	(2.5e-02)
Cluster-level Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(3.5e-03)	(3.5e-03)	(2.8e-03)	(2.8e-03)	(2.5e-03)	(2.5e-03)	(2.0e-03)	(2.1e-03)
Panel B: Quadratic specification								
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.14***	0.09**	0.12***	0.12***	0.15***	0.09***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cluster-level Travel Distance	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Cluster-level Travel Distance)^2	1.0e-04	-4.0e-05	1.3e-03***	1.2e-03***	1.4e-03***	1.3e-03***	1.2e-03***	1.2e-03***
	(2.6e-04)	(2.6e-04)	(2.7e-04)	(2.7e-04)	(2.6e-04)	(2.6e-04)	(2.2e-04)	(2.3e-04)
Obs.	5641	5135	5641	5135	5172	4698	5172	4698
Mean of nVBT (Info) Group	0.61	0.62	0.23	0.24	0.11	0.12	0.07	0.07
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B7: Number of Village Borders

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Boundary Effect only – No Distance Measure								
Crossed 1st Bound.	-0.14**	-0.16***	-0.28***	-0.31***	-0.31***	-0.33***	-0.24***	-0.27***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 2nd Bound.	-0.11*	-0.09	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 3rd Bound.	0.04	0.05	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Add. Impact 4th Bound.	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 5th Bound.	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08*	-0.05	-0.06*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Linear specification – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Crossed 1st Bound.	-0.07	-0.10*	-0.12***	-0.22***	-0.24***	-0.26***	-0.20***	-0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 2nd Bound.	-0.12*	-0.09	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 3rd Bound.	0.08	0.09*	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-1.0e-03	-0.02	1.5e-04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Add. Impact 4th Bound.	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	-2.5e-03	0.012
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 5th Bound.	0.05	0.04	0.02	1.8e-03	0.01	4.5e-04	0.01	-1.5e-03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(3.7e-03)	(3.7e-03)	(3.0e-03)	(3.1e-03)	(2.5e-03)	(2.6e-03)
Panel C: Quadratic specification – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Crossed 1st Boundary	-0.09	-0.13**	-0.14**	-0.17***	-0.19***	-0.22***	-0.15***	-0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 2nd Bound.	-0.12*	-0.09	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 3rd Bound.	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.02	-0.01	3.5e-03	-0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Add. Impact 4th Bound.	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Add. Impact 5th Bound.	0.05	0.04	3.3e-03	-0.01	-3.2e-03	-0.01	-2.1e-03	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01	-7.2e-04	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Travel Distance)^2	-3.6e-04	-7.2e-04	1.2e-03***	9.7e-04**	1.1e-03**	9.3e-04**	9.4e-04**	7.6e-04**
	(5.3e-04)	(5.1e-04)	(4.4e-04)	(4.2e-04)	(4.2e-04)	(4.0e-04)	(3.6e-04)	(3.5e-04)
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Mean VBT	0.75	0.77	0.54	0.56	0.45	0.46	0.32	0.34
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B8: Economic Magnitude of Settlement Boundary and Distance

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Economic Magnitudes								
Panel A Magnitudes:								
VBT	6222***	6489***	6055***	6169***	6575***	6737***	4771***	5119***
	(1383)	(1432)	(1055)	(1064)	(1110)	(1115)	(800)	(835)
SBT	254	144	2026***	1853**	2529***	2400***	2801***	2570***
	(755)	(765)	(731)	(746)	(775)	(801)	(723)	(752)
Panel B Magnitudes:								
VBT	4042***	4204***	3423***	3636***	4201***	4544***	2864***	3345***
	(1225)	(1268)	(1004)	(1011)	(1036)	(1056)	(758)	(797)
SBT	306	401	1384*	1256*	2002**	1926**	2446***	2259***
	(819)	(836)	(752)	(764)	(794)	(819)	(731)	(767)
Cluster-level Travel Distance	342***	375***	438***	437***	416***	409***	306***	297***
	(125)	(131)	(84)	(86)	(77)	(78)	(54)	(58)
Panel A Obs.	5797	5285	5797	5285	5321	4841	5321	4841
Panel B Obs.	5631	5127	5631	5127	5163	4691	5163	4691
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B9: Full Treatment Breakdown

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.12**	0.13**	0.16***	0.09**	0.13***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Community Engagement	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Trainee Engagement	-0.09	-0.09	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Transport	-0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.07**	0.08**	0.07**	0.09***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
VBT × CE	0.17**	0.15**	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
VBT × TE	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GT × CE	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Travel Distance	-0.01	-3.3e-03	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Travel Distance)^2	-1.5e-04	-4.5e-04	1.2e-03***	9.8e-04**	1.1e-03***	9.4e-04**	9.2e-04***	7.3e-04**
	(5.0e-04)	(5.0e-04)	(4.5e-04)	(4.4e-04)	(4.2e-04)	(4.1e-04)	(3.5e-04)	(3.5e-04)
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Mean of nVBT (Info) Group	0.61	0.63	0.24	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.08
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B10: Effect by Neighbor Treatment

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Boundary Effect only – No Distance Measure								
Village Based Training	0.23***	0.24***	0.32***	0.33***	0.35***	0.36***	0.28***	0.29***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Neighbor	0.02	0.01	0.01	-1.0e-03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Neighbor	-0.05	-0.05	-2.3e-03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: No Distance Interaction – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.14***	0.17***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.18***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neighbor	0.02	0.01	0.01	3.6e-04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Neighbor	-0.05	-0.05	-1.4e-03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(4.2e-03)	(4.1e-03)	(3.1e-03)	(3.2e-03)	(2.6e-03)	(2.7e-03)	(2.1e-03)	(2.2e-03)
Panel C: Distance Interaction								
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.22***	0.24***	0.19***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neighbor	-0.10	-0.13	-0.17	-0.20	-0.18	-0.22	-0.19	-0.23
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
VBT × Neighbor	-0.02	-0.01	3.3e-03	-0.00	-0.08	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.08*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(4.3e-03)	(4.3e-03)	(3.1e-03)	(3.2e-03)	(2.5e-03)	(2.6e-03)	(2.0e-03)	(2.2e-03)
Travel Distance × Neighbor	3.1e-03	3.6e-03	-2.9e-04	-3.1e-04	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.2e-03)	(4.4e-03)	(3.6e-03)	(3.7e-03)	(3.3e-03)	(3.5e-03)
Obs.	5872	5348	5872	5348	5392	4900	5392	4900
Mean of nVBT (Info) Group	0.61	0.63	0.24	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.081
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B11: Individual-level Stipend and Village Average Stipend

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Boundary Effect only – No Distance Measure								
Village Based Training	0.22***	0.23***	0.33***	0.33***	0.34***	0.35***	0.28***	0.29***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trainee Stipend (000s in PKR)	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.5e-03)	0.01	(4.4e-03)	(0.01)
Village Average Stipend in (000s in PKR)	-3.6e-03	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel B: Linear specification – Distance Measure 1: Straight-Line distance								
Village Based Training	0.11**	0.09*	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.23***	0.19***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Trainee Stipend (000s in PKR)	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.5e-03)	0.01	(4.4e-03)	(4.6e-03)
Village Average Stipend (000s in PKR)	-2.6e-03	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Straight-line Distance	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(3.8e-03)	(3.8e-03)	(3.0e-03)	(3.1e-03)
Panel C: Quadratic specification – Distance Measure 1: Straight-Line distance								
Village Based Training	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***	0.24***	0.21***	0.23***	0.18***	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Trainee Stipend (000s)	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.5e-03)	(0.01)	(4.4e-03)	(0.01)
Village Average Stipend (000s in PKR)	2.4e-03	-1.0e-03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Straight-line Distance	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Straight-line Distance)^2	2.5e-02	2.3e-02	-1.0e-02	-6.9e-03	-2.2e-02	-1.9e-02	-1.8e-02	-1.7e-02
	(2.0e-02)	(1.9e-02)	(1.8e-02)	(1.8e-02)	(1.6e-02)	(1.6e-02)	(1.2e-02)	(1.3e-02)
Obs.	5872	5348	5872	5348	5392	4900	5392	4900
Mean of nVBT	0.61	0.63	0.24	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.08
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B11 – Continued

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel D: Linear specification – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.13***	0.18***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.18***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trainee Stipend (000s in PKR)	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.040***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.5e-03)	(0.01)	(4.4e-03)	(0.01)
Village Average Stipend (000s in PKR)	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	1.2e-03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.012***
	(4.2e-03)	(4.1e-03)	(3.1e-03)	(3.1e-03)	(2.5e-03)	(2.6e-03)	(2.0e-03)	(2.2e-03)
Panel E: Quadratic specification – Distance Measure 2: Travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.15***	0.16***	0.12***	0.14***	0.16***	0.18***	0.14***	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trainee Stipend (000s)	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(4.5e-03)	(0.01)	(4.4e-03)	(0.01)
Village Average Stipend (000s in PKR)	-0.01	-0.01	2.4e-03	-7.0e-04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-4.0e-03	1.3e-03	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
$(\text{Travel Distance})^2$	-3.5e-04	-6.6e-04	1.1e-03**	9.3e-04**	9.4e-04**	8.9e-04**	8.1e-04**	7.2e-04**
	(5.2e-04)	(5.0e-04)	(4.3e-04)	(4.3e-04)	(4.1e-04)	(4.0e-04)	(3.5e-04)	(3.5e-04)
Obs.	5872	5348	5872	5348	5392	4900	5392	4900
Mean of nVBT	0.61	0.63	0.24	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.08
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table B12: Additional Boundaries - Quadratic Specifications

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Within Village Boundaries: Cluster-level travel distance								
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.14***	0.09**	0.11***	0.12***	0.13***	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Settlement Based Training	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.07**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cluster-level Travel Distance	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Cluster-level Travel Distance)^2	8.2e-05	-1.2e-05	1.2e-03***	1.1e-03***	1.2e-03***	1.2e-03***	9.8e-04***	1.0e-03***
	(2.8e-04)	(2.7e-04)	(2.7e-04)	(2.7e-04)	(2.6e-04)	(2.5e-04)	(2.1e-04)	(2.2e-04)
Panel B: Outside Village Boundaries: Travel distance								
Crossing 1st Boundary	-0.11**	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.18***	-0.19***	-0.22***	-0.15***	-0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Crossing 2 or more Boundaries	-0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-3.5e-03	2.6e-03	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
(Travel Distance)^2	-3.3e-04	-6.9e-04	1.2e-03***	9.7e-04**	1.1e-03***	9.3e-04**	9.4e-04***	7.5e-04**
	(5.2e-04)	(5.0e-04)	(4.4e-04)	(4.3e-04)	(4.2e-04)	(4.0e-04)	(3.6e-04)	(3.5e-04)
Panels A Obs.	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691	4691
Panels B Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Supplemental Materials Not for Publication

Appendix C: Heterogeneity Analysis

Here we discuss in detail each of the results presented in Table 6 in the main text. Moreover, we also provide the full regressions behind these results (including separate results for each component when an index is used).

Village Connectivity We examine whether the boundary effect varies by how "connected" a village is to the outside world. Services and facilities such as bus lines, railway stops, and post offices transfer information in and out. Consequently, residents of more connected villages may have a better understanding of the economic and social consequences associated with crossing boundaries. The results in Panel A of Table 6 test whether the boundary effect varies by the availability of transport and non-transport facilities such as banks, hospitals and post offices.[32] The coefficients on the interaction terms between VBT and the two dummy indicators that measure the presence of these facilities provide little evidence of heterogeneity by village connectivity. These results suggest that economic and geographic connectivity has little bearing on a woman's ability to travel outside her community, further bolstering our explanation that distance effects faced by women are not about economic factors but reflect social constraints.

Ethnic Diversity We next examine whether the boundary effect varies by how ethnically diverse or homogeneous one's environment is. First, residents of a diverse village may face a smaller boundary effect because different ethnic groups have been mixed to such an extent that boundaries have become blurred. Second, if the ethnic composition of the sending and receiving villages is similar, then people may feel less constrained in crossing boundaries because the change in social environments between villages is negligible. Panel B of Table 6 tests these intuitions and examines heterogeneity by village-level ethnic homogeneity. In line with our first intuition, we construct an ethnic fragmentation index, $1-\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2$, where p_i is the proportion of people who belong to group i, and n is the number of groups in a village. Our results (Row 1 in Panel B of Table 6) shows that for three out of the four take-up outcomes, the coefficients on the interaction terms between VBT and the fragmentation measure are positive and significant, which suggests that women living in ethnically diverse

[32]The expanded results of our examination of village connectivity are presented in Appendix Tables C2 and C3.

villages face a smaller boundary effect.[33] In other words, ethnic diversity makes it easier for a woman to travel outside her village. However, whether this is just a proxy of ethnic overlap between sending and receiving villages remains unclear. Consequently, we create an inter-village ethnic difference index by calculating the difference in proportion of each ethnic group between the sending and receiving villages, taking the absolute values of the difference, and adding the numbers up. A larger score therefore implies a larger difference (lower ethnic overlap) in the ethnic structure between the two villages. The results (Row 2, Panel B) provide some support for the ethnic overlap reasoning: The more a sending village differs from a receiving village in ethnic composition, the less likely a woman would accept a voucher for training.[34] However, the ethnic overlap considerations are not important for other (more demanding) take-up measures, suggesting that the ethnic diversity effect is driven more by something that is special about the sending community in terms of its acceptance of women's traveling outside, regardless of their destinations.[35]

Socioeconomic Status We next examine whether a household's socioeconomic status may mediate the boundary effect. Conventional wisdom may suggest that poorer people face a larger boundary effect because they may find traveling less affordable. However, our analysis suggests the opposite. In the regressions within Panel C, Table 6, we first use three measures of household economic status: standardized log monthly income and two dummy indicators that take the value of 1 if a respondent's monthly household income and asset index score fall into her village's bottom 30 percent, respectively. The coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that for all four take-up outcomes, women from poorer households are subject to a *smaller* boundary effect. This is likely because the poor are not only compelled to participate in economic activities under financial pressure, but (per-

[33]The expanded results of our ethnic diversity analysis are presented in Appendix Tables C4 and C5.

[34]Because the ethnic difference index, by definition, takes the value of zero for observations within VBT villages, we cannot include an interaction between the VBT dummy and the index in our regression. Instead, we present the "main effect" of the ethnic difference index to shed light on the relationship between inter-village ethnic overlap and program take-up.

[35]As a robustness check, we also interacted the VBT treatment dummy with a village-level ethnic polarization index, a dummy indicator of whether a village displays any diversity, as well as indicators of a woman's minority and majority status in both her home and destination villages. Our results consistently reveal heterogeneity by village-level ethnic diversity but not by differences in ethnic composition between villages. Therefore our results suggest that, perhaps as a result of intermingling and constant exposure to other groups, residents of ethnically diverse communities are likely to find boundaries less relevant and crossing them less costly.

haps as a result) they are also often thought to have not as much "social status" to begin with and thus have less to lose. Therefore, while the poor actively pursue economic opportunities in violation of some preset boundaries, the rich might choose to respect these boundaries to uphold their "social dignity." This is borne out in qualitative and quantitative work. For example, Jacoby and Mansuri (2015) find it is only high-caste girls who face lower primary enrollment when attending school requires crossing a settlement boundary within their village. Other studies find that the social practice of secluding women is much stronger among wealthier households than among the poor and is regarded by them as a characteristic of respectability (Sathar and Kazi, 2000;Mumtaz and Salway (2005);Mumtaz et al., 2012). In her examination of economic history, Goldin (1995) points out that in early stages of industrialization, women's labor force participation may drop because on one hand, newly available blue-collar jobs tend to be stigmatized for women, while on the other hand, these jobs promote men's income and reduce the need for women to work. In the U.S., for instance, it was with the increase in (socially acceptable) white-collar, clerical jobs over time that women's labor force participation began to rise.

Further analysis leads to similar findings with respect to women's education levels. In Panel C, Table 6, we interact the VBT treatment dummy with a binary indicator of whether the female respondent has never been to school. For voucher acceptance, the coefficient on the interaction terms is negative and significant, suggesting that the VBT treatment has a smaller impact on *uneducated* women, perhaps because they, like women from poorer households, have less social status to lose when traveling outside their village. We conduct a number of robustness checks using a variety of measures to determine one's income, asset and education level. The results consistently reveal a smaller boundary effect for the poor and less educated.

Female Agency & Perceptions To the extent the boundary effect is not a result of a woman's own concerns (such as concerns about her safety, anxiety around travel, or worry about her own household obligations) but those imposed upon her by others, we should find that the boundary effect is smaller for women who have greater agency.[36] This lack of agency likely comes from domestic pressure, which may take a variety of forms including the expectation for women to look after other household members and men's control over women's lives. In general, our findings suggest that the boundary effect is smaller (larger)

[36]Please note that some of the dummy variables coding female agency in this section indicate a lack of agency rather than greater agency. The direction of increase in agency will typically be clear from the discussion.

for women facing less (greater) pressure.

We first turn to measures of the extent to which a woman is "needed" in the household. In rural Pakistan, women are typically the primary caretakers of their families. Consequently, we first examine the level of women's responsibility for looking after their households as a potential channel for heterogeneity, using household size as a proxy. As shown in Row 1 of Panel D, Table 6, the coefficients on the interaction terms between VBT and household size are positive and significant for all four take-up outcomes. That is to say, the larger a woman's household, the larger a boundary effect she faces.[37]

In addition to the presence of dependents, needs may also arise if a member is frequently absent. In our baseline surveys, we asked whether a household has had at least one (i) male or (ii) female member who was away for three months or more in the previous year. Rows 2 and 3 in Panel D, Table 6 show that while male absence does not affect the boundary effect, female absence does. Simply having had a woman who was absent from her household makes it far less likely that a potential female trainee can travel outside her village. We should caution though that such absences are quite infrequent and this result is driven by a very small number of households where a female member has been gone for an extended period.

Second, we now consider measures that directly capture how much influence a woman has in decision-making within her household. Since we have several questions that get at this in our baseline surveys, for presentational tractability, we create two separate indices to measure (i) a woman's influence over household matters, such as whether she needs permission to become involved in new activities,[38] and (ii) over business decisions, such as her confidence in running a business.[39] Rows 4 and 5 in Panel D, Table 6 show that

[37]To check the robustness of our finding, we explore several alternative measures of household responsibility, such as the number of children, the number of elderly, the number of adults aged between 18 and 60, and the presence of sick household members. Based on these checks, it is the number of children and adults that drives the heterogeneity around household responsibility. We do not find any variation of the VBT effect by the number of elderly members or the presence of sick people (see Appendix Tables C10, C11, C12, C13 and C14). This suggests that it is the more regular household needs that may be restricting womens' travel.

[38]Our domestic influence index is based on five variables measuring whether women think they will be able to take part in new activities without family permission; can influence their husband to begin new activities; will keep daughter(s) in school; can increase spending on children's clothing with permission; and will be able to purchase a new sewing machine despite initial disagreement.

[39]The business influence index is built upon eight variables: Do you think you are able to run your own business? Obtain credit? Make sure that your employees get work done properly? Manage financial accounts? Bargain to obtain cheap input prices? Collect debt? If your husband is going to buy land and you think it is not the right time to do it, can you

the boundary effect varies by the former and not by the latter. Specifically, the interaction terms between VBT and the domestic influence index are negative and significant for three out of four take-up outcomes, suggesting that women with more leverage vis-à-vis men in the domestic sphere are more able to cross the village boundary. In Appendix Tables C18 to C22, we show that this effect holds for four out of the five sub-components of the index, particularly for course enrollment and completion. In contrast, as Row 5 in Panel D, Table 6 shows, the boundary effect does not vary by the business influence index. Interestingly, the women's business influence index itself does increase program take-up for three of the four take-up measures (Table C23), an indication that business influence is indeed capturing a real factor that affects women's take-up decisions. We show further evidence of our finding in Appendix Tables C24 to C31, where the coefficients on the interaction terms between VBT and the business influence index's components are rarely significant.

Related to the question of influence, we also explore whether the boundary effect varies by women's marital status, which we code as a binary variable. Row 6 of Panel D, Table 6 indicates that for all four take-up outcomes, the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive and significant, which implies that married women face fewer constraints related to crossing boundaries. This may partly reflect the fact that (in our data) married women show significantly higher levels of domestic influence (as measured by the index).[40]

Finally, we turn to a series of gender-related questions that we broadly group under a sub-category called "perception." These measures further elucidate how women and men's thinking may affect women's ability to travel. We first construct two separate indices based on men's and women's responses to the same set of four gender equality questions.[41] Rows 7 and 8 in Panel D, Table 6 reveal some evidence that the more strongly men in their household believe in their superiority to women, the more of a boundary effect is experienced by these women.[42] In contrast, women's attitude on gender equality does not seem to matter, which suggests that it is really men's opinion (and likely control) that affects women's mobility in his context. This asymmetry of whose beliefs matter continues in other relevant

influence him to do it later? If your household is going to borrow from a source that you think is not the right source, can you influence them to change their decision?

[40] Appendix Table C32 shows the expanded results of take-up regressions involving marital status.

[41] Separately to male and female respondents, we asked how men compare to women intellectually, spiritually, morally, and in terms of management of daily affairs.

[42] The result is significant for only one of the four components and marginally significant (p-values of 15 & 13%) for two others (though for these two, the interaction term is in fact significant in the specifications without controls - see Appendix Table C33).

measures. Surprisingly, a woman's willingness to travel, as proxied by whether the female respondent desires or has attempted to find a job in a different location, has little impact on the boundary effect she may experience (Row 9 of Panel D). However, the interaction terms between the VBT dummy and male openness to traveling for work are positive and significant for three out of four take-up outcomes (Row 10 of Panel D), implying that crossing the boundary is harder for women whose male household members express an interest in working elsewhere. The latter is in line with our hypothesis of domestic pressure, and both results imply that the preferences of males in their household influence women's choices about leaving the home, thereby raising the costs for women to cross boundaries. Notably, in these regressions, male openness to traveling for work is not correlated with women's overall take-up rates (Appendix Table C35), but women's attitude has a significant, positive relationship with their own take-up (Appendix Table C36). The fact that these measures have direct impact on take-up (and the opposite interacted effects with VBT) shows that while our measures of male and female attitude on traveling are valid, men's attitude might take precedence over women's preferences in terms of a woman's ability to travel. This is perhaps even more starkly illustrated when we next consider a woman's own desire to enroll.

Women's own demand for training is measured as a binary variable, which takes the value of 1 if a female respondent said she was very likely to receive training during our baseline survey. The last row in Panel D of Table 6 reveals that for three out of our four take-up measures, the coefficients on the interaction terms are *positive* and significant, indicating that women with a stronger demand for training in fact face a larger boundary effect. We find similar results when using an alternative indicator of a woman's demand, which equals 1 if she expects the skills taught by the training to improve her income or social status "a lot" (Appendix Table C38). This result offers a sobering note, since not only is it the case that women who demonstrate greater demand are not any more likely to be able to cross the boundary, but in fact such women show a *greater* boundary effect (partly because their baseline desire to enroll is higher). These results provide additional evidence to support lack of agency (to resist social & household pressures) as a source of access constraints, because women's desire for skills seems to be trumped by other considerations rooted in the domestic sphere, such as the expectation to look after family members or male dominance over female activities.

Perception of Safety In addition to domestic pressure, another hypothesis is that if the boundary effect varies by the perception of safety in an insecure region, village-based training may go a long way in promoting take-up. In fact, such concerns of safety are often given as reasons for potentially paternalistic constraints women face. However, our analysis does not offer robust support for this safety hypothesis. To measure the perception of safety, we create a household-level ("insecurity") index based on five variables: The first two asked female and male respondents whether they felt unsafe; and the other three asked whether female respondents perceived rule of law to be dysfunctional in the local environment, whether they perceived local crime rates to be on the rise, and whether their families suffered losses from criminal activities in recent months. Panel E in Table 6 shows, for all four take-up outcomes, coefficients on the interaction terms between the VBT dummy and the standardized version of the aforementioned insecurity index. None of the interaction terms is significant, thereby failing to provide evidence in favor of the safety hypothesis. Appendix C below presents the results separately for each component (Table C40 to Table C44). The only component that shows some impact is female perception of safety in Table C41—women who felt unsafe are less likely to pursue the training if it is outside their village, though the interaction term is only significant for voucher submission, and part of this may also be driven by concerns arising from what could be perceived as challenging social norms. Thus overall, the evidence is weak for a safety-based hypothesis whereby women hesitate to leave the village primarily because they fear physical harm due to unsafe/criminal conditions.

In summary, our fairly exhaustive examination of the boundary effect lends a lot more support to our hypothesis that distance constraints, especially the boundary effect, are driven primarily by perceived societal concerns that may generate a loss of "social status" for the household when a female household member leaves the village (even temporarily). Our study finds evidence for this argument because women who enjoy more agency, have less social status to begin with (as proxied by their socioeconomic status), and come from ethnically diverse communities seem better able to overcome such societal constraints.

Table C1: Treatment Balance Table – All Treatment Arms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	nVBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + GT	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE + GT
Household Variables:								
Monthly Income	11.90	0.07	0.79	0.21	0.63	0.38	0.14	0.47
	(0.45)	(0.65)	(0.53)	(0.63)	(0.55)	(0.63)	(0.66)	(0.57)
Monthly Expenditure	10.06	0.13	0.01	0.23	-0.15	0.01	-0.02	0.484
	(0.52)	(0.60)	(0.63)	(0.68)	(0.66)	(0.63)	(0.67)	(0.67)
Asset Index	0.04	0.01	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.08	-0.02	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Household Size	6.75	0.24	0.23	0.19	0.05	0.23	0.19	0.26
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Household Head Is Punjabi	0.42	-0.05	-0.02	-0.06	-0.04	-0.07	-0.12	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
No Household Member	0.47	0.04	0.06	-0.03	0.05	-2.7e-03	0.04	0.02
Is Sick	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
At Least 1 Male Away for	0.13	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.01
3 Months or More	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
At Least 1 Female Away for	0.03	0.01	9.7e-03	0.01	0.01	0.014	0.01	0.02
3 Months or More	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Suffered from Crimes in	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-2.6e-03	3.6e-03	0.01
Recent Months	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Table C1 – Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	nVBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + GT	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE + GT
Trainee Variables:								
Age	29.22	-1.67	-0.98	-1.48	-0.80	0.23	-0.97	-0.75
	(0.53)	(0.68)	(0.74)	(0.73)	(0.68)	(0.78)	(0.83)	(0.76)
Married	0.69	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Number of Children	1.87	-0.03	-0.12	-0.17	-0.11	3.2e-03	0.08	-0.01
under Age 9	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Mobile Phone Ownership	0.12	-0.02	0.01	-1.2e-03	9.2e-04	-0.02	-0.05	1.5e-04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
PCA Influence over	-0.07	-0.14	-0.01	-0.15	-0.08	0.01	-0.10	-0.01
Domestic Decisions	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
PCA Influence over	-0.13	-0.01	-0.11	-0.15	-0.09	-0.22	-0.23	-0.22
Business Decisions	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
PCA Female Belief	0.16	0.21	0.09	0.22	0.12	0.14	0.22	0.12
in Male Superiority	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
In Good or Very Good	0.82	3.0e-03	1.4e-03	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
Physical Health	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
K6 Mental Health Scale	20.85	0.35	-0.04	-0.40	0.75	0.51	-0.34	-0.39
	(0.52)	(0.67)	(0.62)	(0.70)	(0.63)	(0.74)	(0.73)	(0.76)
Has Formal Education	0.37	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Has Never Been to School	0.23	-0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.02	-0.02	7.2e-04
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Has Basic Literacy	0.40	-0.01	-0.03	-0.07	-1.9e-03	-0.04	0.01	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)

Table C1 – Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	nVBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + GT	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE + GT
Trainee Variables (Continued):								
Stitched Last Month	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.03	-9.4e-04	-0.03	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Able to Stitch	0.32	-0.03	-2.1e-03	1.6e-03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	2.2e-03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Does Paid Work	0.28	-0.07	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Confident in Finding	3.22	-2.2e-03	-0.08	-0.16	-0.16	-2.2e-03	-0.065	-0.24
Paid Work	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Does Chores	0.66	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Financial Satisfaction	6.68	0.18	0.20	0.19	0.38	0.08	-0.15	0.05
(0-10)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Likely or Very Likely	0.74	0.04	0.04	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.03
to Enroll in Training	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Considers Rule of	0.23	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.03
to Enroll in Training	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Considers Crime	0.39	-1.1e-03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02
Rate Increasing	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Trusts the Police	0.22	-0.01	0.03	-0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Trusts the Courts	0.28	1.1e-03	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Trusts Government	0.83	0.05	-2.0e-03	0.04	3.2e-03	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
Health Services	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Trusts Education Services	0.74	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-5.5e-04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)

Table C1 – Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	nVBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT (Info)	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. VBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + TE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + GT	nVBT (Info) vs. nVBT + CE + GT
Village Variables:								
Ethnic Fragmentation Index	0.13	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-2.0e-03	0.04	0.03	1.1e-03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Ethnic Polarization Index	0.25	-0.02	-0.02	0.08	-0.02	0.06	0.04	1.6e-03
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Number of NGOs at Work	1.06	0.16	0.01	0.09	0.10	-0.04	0.15	0.053
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Has Access to Public	0.62	0.13	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.080	0.06
Transport Stops	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Has Access to	0.76	0.10	-0.04	0.11	0.05	0.28	0.12	-0.02
Non-Transport Facilities	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Total Number of	16.18	0.47	-1.30	-0.53	-0.95	-1.05	1.56	-0.88
Signal Bars	(1.02)	(1.31)	(1.35)	(1.43)	(1.37)	(1.38)	(1.50)	(1.39)
Petrol Price	80.77	-1.06	-0.76	-1.91	-2.02	-0.95	-1.46	-1.84
(Rupee per Liter)	(0.56)	(0.76)	(0.82)	(0.81)	(0.93)	(0.80)	(0.85)	(0.84)
Bus Available	0.36	7.8e-04	-0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.02	0.17	0.03
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Qingchi Available	0.48	0.12	0.19	0.04	0.08	0.17	0.06	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)

Heterogeneity by Village Connectivity

Table C2: Effect by Availability of Transport Facilities

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.15***	0.15***	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.24***	0.19***	0.21***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Availability of Transport Facilities	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04*	0.04	0.05***	0.05**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Availability of Transport Facilities	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C3: Effect by Availability of Non-transport Facilities

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.19***	0.18***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.25***	0.20***	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Availability of Non-transport Facilities	0.08**	0.08**	0.03	0.03	0.04*	0.04*	0.04**	0.03*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Availability of Non-transport Facilities	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Heterogeneity by Ethnic Diversity

Table C4: Effect by Standardized Ethnic Fragmentation Index

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Ethnic Fragmentation Index	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Ethnic Fragmentation Index	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5873	5348	5873	5348	5393	4900	5393	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C5: Effect by Standardized Ethnic Difference Index

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.08*	0.09**	0.16***	0.18***	0.21***	0.23***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Inter-Village Ethnic Difference Index	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5596	5092	5596	5092	5132	4659	5132	4659
Controls		X		X		X		X

Heterogeneity by Socioeconomic Status

Table C6: Effect by Household Monthly Income – Continuous Measure

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.12***	0.13***	0.16***	0.18***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Ln Household Monthly Income	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01**	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Ln Household Monthly Income	0.02	0.04**	0.01	0.03*	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5692	5348	5692	5348	5225	4900	5225	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C7: Effect by Household Monthly Income – Binary Measure

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.15***	0.16***	0.19***	0.22***	0.23***	0.26***	0.20***	0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household Income in Village's Bottom 30%	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Household Income in Village's Bottom 30%	-0.05**	-0.07**	-0.06***	-0.09***	-0.06**	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5692	5348	5692	5348	5225	4900	5225	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C8: Effect by Household Asset Index – Binary Measure

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.14***	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.25***	0.20***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household Asset Index in Village's Bottom 30%	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Household Asset Index in Village's Bottom 30%	-0.04	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5692	5348	5692	5348	5225	4900	5225	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C9: Effect by Education Status

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.18***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Has Never Been to School	0.12***	0.14***	0.05*	0.06**	0.03	0.05**	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Has Never Been to School	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5695	5348	5695	5348	5228	4900	5228	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Heterogeneity by Female Agency: Need

Table C10: Effect by Household Size

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.18***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Household Size	0.03***	0.05***	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Household Size	0.03**	0.03*	0.04***	0.04***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5735	5348	5735	5348	5266	4900	5266	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C11: Effect by Number of Children (Under 9)

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.16***	0.18***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Number of Children under 9	0.02**	0.04***	0.01	0.03***	0.01	0.02***	0.00	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Number of Children under 9	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03**	0.02	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5735	5348	5735	5348	5266	4900	5266	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C12: Effect by Number of Elderly

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Number of Dependents above Age 60	-0.02**	-0.02*	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Number of Dependents above Age 60	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5735	5348	5735	5348	5266	4900	5266	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C13: Effect by Number of Ablebodied Adult HH Members

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Number of Dependents between Age 18 and 60	0.02*	0.03***	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Number of Dependents between Age 18 and 60	0.03**	0.03**	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5735	5348	5735	5348	5266	4900	5266	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C14: Effect by Presence of Sick HH Members

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Number of Sick HH Members	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Number of Sick HH Members	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5735	5348	5735	5348	5266	4900	5266	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C15: Effect by Male Migration Pattern

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.23***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
At Least 1 Male HH Member Away for 3 Months	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × At Least 1 Male HH Member Away for 3 Months	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5306	5687	5306	5222	4862	5222	4862
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C16: Effect by Female Migration Pattern

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.12***	0.13***	0.16***	0.18***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
At Least 1 Female HH Member Away for 3 Months	-0.08	-0.12	-0.06	-0.06	-0.10***	-0.11**	-0.11***	-0.13***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)
VBT × At Least 1 Female HH Member Away for 3 Months	0.14	0.21**	0.18**	0.23***	0.22***	0.27***	0.20***	0.24***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5715	5348	5715	5348	5247	4900	5247	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Heterogeneity by Female Agency: Influence

Table C17: Effect by Domestic Influence Index

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Domestic Influence Index	-0.02**	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Domestic Influence Index	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C18: Domestic Influence Index Component 1—Ability to Take Part in New Activities without Family Permission

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Undertake New Activities without HH Permission	0.08**	0.07*	0.04	0.05*	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Undertake New Activities without HH Permission	-0.10**	-0.06	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C19: Domestic Influence Index Component 2—Influence over Husband's Decision to Begin New Activities

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.14***	0.19***	0.21***	0.24***	0.26***	0.21***	0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Influence Husband's Decision to Undertake New Activities	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Ability to Influence Husband's Decision to Undertake New Activities	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.07***	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C20: Domestic Influence Index Component 3—Influence over Husband's Decision to Buy A New Sewing Machine

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.15***	0.16***	0.22***	0.24***	0.27***	0.29***	0.24***	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Influence Husband's Decision to Purchase A Sewing Machine	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Ability to Influence Husband's Decision to Purchase A Sewing Machine	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C21: Domestic Influence Index Component 4—Influence over Husband's Decision to Drop Daughter out of School

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.14***	0.19***	0.21***	0.23***	0.25***	0.21***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Influence Husband's Decision about Daugher's Education	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Ability to Influence Husband's Decision about Daugher's Education	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.07***	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C22: Domestic Influence Index Component 5—Influence over Husband's Decision to Increase Spending on Children's Clothing

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.15***	0.19***	0.21***	0.24***	0.26***	0.21***	0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Influence Husband's Spending on Children's Clothing	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Ability to Influence Husband's Spending on Children's Clothing	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C23: Effect by Business Influence Index

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Standardized Business Influence Index	0.02	0.02**	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Business Influence Index	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C24: Business Influence Index Component 1-–Female Ability to Bargain for Cheaper Business Input Prices

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.10**	0.12**	0.13***	0.17***	0.18***	0.22***	0.15***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ability to Bargain for Cheap Input Prices	0.06**	0.06**	0.06***	0.06**	0.05***	0.05**	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Bargain for Cheap Input Prices	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C25: Business Influence Index Component 2—Female Ability to Collect Business Debt

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.10*	0.11**	0.16***	0.19***	0.20***	0.24***	0.17***	0.21***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ability to Collect Debt	0.05*	0.06**	0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	0.06***	0.04**	0.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Collect Debt	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C26: Business Influence Index Component 3—Female Ability to Obtain Credit for Business

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.11**	0.12***	0.13***	0.17***	0.17***	0.20***	0.14***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Obtain Credit	0.06**	0.07***	0.05**	0.05**	0.03*	0.03*	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Obtain Credit	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.06*	0.02	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C27: Business Influence Index Component 4—Female Ability to Supervise Employees

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.10**	0.10**	0.13***	0.16***	0.17***	0.21***	0.14***	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Supervise Employees	0.06**	0.07**	0.05**	0.05**	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Supervise Employees	0.04	0.03	0.06*	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.05*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C28: Business Influence Index Component 5—Female Ability to Manage Financial Accounts

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.11**	0.11**	0.14***	0.17***	0.17***	0.20***	0.15***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Manage Financial Accounts	0.06**	0.06***	0.05**	0.04**	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Manage Financial Accounts	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C29: Business Influence Index Component 6—Female Ability to Run A Business

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.08	0.10**	0.10**	0.14***	0.14***	0.18***	0.12***	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Ability to Run Business	0.07**	0.08**	0.04*	0.04*	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Ability to Run Business	0.06	0.03	0.09**	0.05	0.09**	0.05	0.07**	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C30: Business Influence Index Component 7—Female Influence over Sources of Household Borrowing

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.15***	0.16***	0.17***	0.19***	0.22***	0.24***	0.19***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Influence Household Borrowing Sources	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Ability to Influence Household Borrowing Sources	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C31: Business Influence Index Component 8—Female Influence over Timing of Household Land Purchase

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.14***	0.19***	0.20***	0.23***	0.24***	0.20***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ability to Influence the Timing of Land Purchase	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Ability to Influence the Timing of Land Purchase	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C32: Effect by Marital Status

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.17***	0.17***	0.22***	0.23***	0.27***	0.29***	0.25***	0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Married	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.02*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
VBT × Married	-0.06*	-0.05*	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Heterogeneity by Female Agency: Perception

Table C33: Effect by Male Perception of Male Superiority

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.10**	0.12***	0.14***	0.16***	0.19***	0.22***	0.17***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Standardized PCA Index of Male Belief in Men's Superiority	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized PCA Index of Male Belief in Men's Superiority	0.00	0.01	0.03*	0.03	0.03*	0.03	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	2840	2543	2840	2543	2591	2311	2591	2311
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C34: Effect by Female Perception of Male Superiority

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.17***	0.19***	0.23***	0.25***	0.20***	0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Standardized PCA Index of Female Belief in Men's Superiority	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized PCA Index of Female Belief in Men's Superiority	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	2947	2666	2947	2666	2679	2417	2679	2417
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C35: Effect by Male Openness to Traveling for Work

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.08*	0.08*	0.10**	0.11**	0.14***	0.16***	0.14***	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Man Open to Traveling for Work	0.06**	0.05**	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Man Open to Traveling for Work	0.05	0.06	0.08**	0.10***	0.09**	0.10***	0.07**	0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	3401	3043	3401	3043	3107	2770	3107	2770
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C36: Effect by Female Openness to Traveling for Work

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.10**	0.11***	0.13***	0.15***	0.18***	0.21***	0.17***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Woman Open to Traveling for Work	0.11***	0.13***	0.08**	0.11***	0.07**	0.09**	0.07**	0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
VBT × Woman Open to Traveling for Work	0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	3548	3180	3548	3180	3237	2892	3237	2892
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C37: Effect by Female Demand for Skills

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.12***	0.12***	0.13***	0.16***	0.16***	0.19***	0.13***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Very Likely to Enroll	0.11***	0.09***	0.05**	0.03	0.03**	0.02	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Very Likely to Enroll	0.03	0.03	0.08***	0.07**	0.10***	0.09***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5692	5348	5692	5348	5225	4900	5225	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C38: Effect by Expectation for the Impact of Stitching Skills on Income and Social Status

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***	0.17***	0.17***	0.19***	0.14***	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Expect Stitching to Improve Income/Status A Lot	0.11***	0.09***	0.05***	0.04**	0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Expect Stitching to Improve Income/Status A Lot	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.07***	0.06**	0.05**	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Heterogeneity by Perception of Safety

Table C39: Effect by Standardized PCA Insecurity Index

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.11**	0.13***	0.14***	0.18***	0.20***	0.24***	0.18***	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Standardized Insecurity Index (PCA)	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Standardized Insecurity Index (PCA)	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	2359	2243	2359	2243	2145	2036	2145	2036
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C40: Effect by Male Perception of Safety

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.11**	0.12***	0.15***	0.18***	0.19***	0.23***	0.16***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Man Feels Unsafe	0.07**	0.10***	0.04	0.08*	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
VBT × Man Feels Unsafe	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.09	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	2840	2543	2840	2543	2591	2311	2591	2311
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C41: Effect by Female Perception of Safety

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.12***	0.12***	0.16***	0.18***	0.22***	0.25***	0.19***	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Woman Feels Unsafe	-0.07*	-0.08*	-0.10***	-0.09**	-0.09***	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.07***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
VBT × Woman Feels Unsafe	0.09*	0.11*	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Travel Distance	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	2948	2667	2948	2667	2680	2418	2680	2418
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C42: Effect by Perception of Rule of Law

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.12***	0.12***	0.16***	0.18***	0.19***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percevies Rule of Law as Dysfunctional	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
VBT × Percevies Rule of Law as Dysfunctional	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C43: Effect by Perceived Trend of Local Crime Rates

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.14***	0.15***	0.18***	0.20***	0.21***	0.23***	0.18***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Perceives An Increase in Local Crime Rates	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
VBT × Perceives An Increase in Local Crime Rates	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X

Table C44: Effect by Family Experience with Criminal Losses

	Voucher Acceptance		Voucher Submission		Class Enrollment		Class Completion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Village Based Training	0.13***	0.13***	0.16***	0.19***	0.20***	0.22***	0.17***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Family Recently Suffered Criminal Losses	0.01	0.03	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
VBT × Family Recently Suffered Criminal Losses	-0.02	-0.05	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Travel Distance	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	5687	5348	5687	5348	5220	4900	5220	4900
Controls		X		X		X		X